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THE PROVISION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES IN
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
T is well to remember in the beginning of the consideration
of this subject that the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law is the only one of the Uniform Laws proposed by the
American Bar Association that has been adopted in all the
states and jurisdictions of the United States and which is in
full force and effect therein.
Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Negotiable Instru-
.ments Law several objections had been sustained against
stipulations for costs of collection or attorney's fees. In some
jurisdictions the stipulation was regarded as penal and void
in that it tended to encourage litigation, to oppress debtors
and was against the policy of the law. Some other juris-
dictions held the stipulation made the transaction usuri-
ous and thus made the instrument subject to the statutes
against usury. In still other jurisdictions the stipulation was
enforceable but the negotiability of the instrument was
denied since it was a collateral agreement depending upon
its reasonableness which must be determined by verdict of
a jury. There were some good reasons, however, to sustain
the stipulation as finally placed in the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law. Among the reasons urged prior to the adoption
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of the law why the provision did not make the note void
were that it was incidental and ancillary to the main obliga-
tion intended to make more certain that it should be car-
ried out or to compensate for the trouble and expense in the
event there should be a breach; it was urged that it was an
indemnification assured by the maker against the con-
sequences of his own act for unless in default he would not
have to pay the additional amount. It was also urged that
the provision did not render the obligation uncertain since
commercial paper was expected to be paid promptly and if
so paid no element of uncertainty entered into the contract.
As against the argument of usury it was urged that it does
not render the instrument usurious as the additional amount
was in consideration of additional trouble and expense in-
flicted on the holder and not excessive interest for the loan
or forbearance of the money and that the provision related
to the remedy upon the note should a legal remedy be pur-
sued, rather than to the sum which the maker was bound to
pay.
1
Later in this paper we shall consider in more detail some
of the matters above enumerated.
VARIOUS JURISDICTIONS LISTED AS TO PROVISION
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES.
The provision for attorney's fees in negotiable instruments
is valid and such fees are recoverable today in all jurisdic-
tions, except such a provision is not enforceable in Arkan-
sas, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota and West
Virginia, that is, in less than one-fourth of our states and
jurisdictions, it is not enforceable.
However, in the following jurisdictions, there are some
qualifications, so that the provision is enforceable only after
compliance with statutory conditions precedent: California,
I Ogden's Negotiable Instruments, 4th Ed. Pp. 106-107.
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in case suit is necessary to collect; Canal Zone, if not found
unconscionable by the court; Iowa, not to be taxed as part
of the costs in suit unless an affidavit as required by statute
is made; Florida, affidavit must show amount agreed upon;
Georgia, defendants must receive statutory notice of ten
days before filing of the suit; Massachusetts, only nominal
attorney's fees are included in statutory costs; and Oregon,
a provision for reasonable attorney's fees to be fixed by the
court is commonly used.
Leading up to .the discussion of the subject of this paper
we might make some observations supported by authority
as to attorney's fees. In the United States members of all
branches of the legal profession are entitled to fair compen-
sation for attorney's services rendered on a contract express
or implied; 2 from a very early period, even in cases where
the plaintiff could not otherwise enforce his right to fees for
services, an action could be maintained upon a bill of ex-
change, promissory note, or other obligation given in con-
sideration of his services.' But where the legislature by spe-
cial enactment fixes the compensation of attorneys, such
statute will supersede any express or implied contract to pay
for such services.4
And, the fact that attorney's fees are not limited by stat-
ute does not prevent their enforcement by way of contract.5
EFFECT OF PROVISION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES SINCE
ADOPTION OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW.
Much discussion has arisen as to attorney's fees since the
adoption of subdivision 5 of Section 2 of the Negotiable In-
2 U. S. Savings Bank v. Pittman, 80 Ala. 423, 86 So. 567 (1920); Thigpen
& Harold v. Slattery, 140 La. 780, 73 So. 780 (1917); Cicalese v. Fortunato, 92
N. J. Eq. 329, 112 A. 508 (1920).
8 Mowat v. Braun, 19 F. 87 (C. C. Minn., 1884); Mooney v. Lloyd, 5 Sarg.
& Rawle 412 (Pa., 1819).
4 Herrick v. Barzee, 96 Or. 357, 190 P. 141, 6 C. J. 753, notes 52, 53 (1920).
5 Yates v. Robertson, 80 Va. 475 (1885).
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struments Law. This section excluding other subdivisions
thereof than said subdivision 5 is as follows:
"Sec. 2. The sum payable is a sum certain within the
meaning of this act, although it is to be paid....
(5) with costs of collection or an attorney's fee, in
case payment shall not be made at maturity."
This sub-section is not in the English Bills of Exchange
Act, which was the pattern for our Negotiable Instruments
Law and any decisions from that source are necessarily lack-
ing.
This provision in the Negotiable Instruments Law settled,
generally, the question as to the negotiability of an instru-
ment with such a provision, but it did not settle, definitely
some questions as to attorney's fees, which prior to its
adoption, had given rise to much litigation and conflict of
decisions.
An expert and authority on the subject of negotiable in-
struments stated of this provision and some others that
"nothing but good could come from enacting that the nego-
tiability of an instrument is not destroyed by a clause pro-
viding for the-payment of the costs of collection or an at.
torney's fee in case of default." This authority only referred
to the matter of negotiability and not to the validity in
general.6
The provision "concerns only the effect of such a provision
upon negotiability and does not bear upon its validity, con-
struction or enforceability." In effect then this clause does
not declare such a stipulation valid, but merely that it shall
not render the paper non-negotiable. Some courts, however,
declare: "The legislative act, which contains language ap-
propriate only to saving the negotiable character of instru-
ments which contain stipulations for the payment of attor-
ney's fees, should not be construed to impart validity to such
6 James Barr Ames, 14 Harv. L. Rev. 241.
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stipulations notwithstanding an established rule of the com-
mon law to the contrary." '
This latter view, however, does not seem to be in accord
with the spirit of the Negotiable Instruments Law nor found-
ed on good reason. The fact that the legislature made pro-
vision for the stipulation of attorney's fees shows that it
legalized (impliedly, at least) the existence of such a stipula-
tion on a note. If it had been the intent of the legislature to
consider it void, it would have declared so, or omitted to
mention it altogether. The language and spirit of the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law clearly recognizes its validity. The
decision of Miller v. Kyle, as quoted above, is certainly a
manifestation of the tendency of the courts to adhere to
what is ancient without paying due regard to the change
of conditions, and to use every effort to evade statutory
provisions that are enacted to remedy existing evils.'
The Negotiable Instruments Law changed the law as to
the negotiability of an instrument with such a provision in
the states of Maryland, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and
Oklahoma; the question as to the validity of a stipulation
for attorney's fees in a promissory note being unsettled in
Virginia, it was held that in view of the purpose and policy
of the Negotiable' Instruments Law and the course of de-
cision in other states, such a stipulation should be regarded
as valid.'
In the Virginia decision, the court states: "The case, thus
presents to this court, for the first time since the enactment
of the Negotiable Instruments Law the question of the valid-
7 Miller v. Kyle, 85 0. S. 186, 97 N. E. 372 (1911); Raleigh County Bank
v. Poteet, 74 W. Va. 511, 82 S. E. 332 (1914).
8 Albino Z, The Ques. of the Validity of a Stip. for Atty's Fees Under the
N. I. L., 10 Mich. L. Rev. 485 (1912). The weight of authority sustains both the
validity of the stipulation and the negotiability of the Instrument. Second Nat.
Bank v. Auglin, 6 Wash. 403, 33 P. 1056 (1893); Salisbury v. Stewart, 15 Utah
308, 49 P. 777 (1897); Bank of Commerce v. Fuqua, 11 Mont. 285, 28 P. 291
(1891); Ramsey v. Thomas, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 431, 38 S. W. 259 (1896); Smith
v. Silvers, 32 Ind. 321 (1869).
9 Colley v. Summers-Parrott Hardware Co., 119 Va. 439, 89 S. E. 906, Ann.
Cas. 1917 D, 375 (1916).
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ity of such a provision in an instrument governed by the
laws of this state. No question arises as to the effect of the
provision upon the negotiability of the paper; the statute
in terms resolving that previously mooted question in favor
of the stipulation. As to its validity, the authorities in the
various jurisdictions are in conflict, and the same may be
said of the decisions in Virginia . . . The weight of outside
authority sustains the validity of the stipulation." Then the
court states that the purpose and policy of the Negotiable
Instruments Law should not be disregarded and that in giv-
ing recognition to that purpose and policy the court should
not be unmindful of the course of decisions which already
prevails in a majority of the states having substantially the
same statutory law upon the subject; and that uniformity
of interpretation and enforcement is no less important than
uniformity of enactment."0
In those jurisdictions opposed to the majority rule such
a provision has been held not to be enforceable on the ground
that it is a (1) penalty, or (2) a device to evade the usury
statutes, or (3) tends to the encouragement of litigation and
generally in such jurisdictions clause 5 of section 2 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law is held not to have changed
the rule as to enforceability of the provision."
In 1892 five years prior to the adoption of the Uniform
Law in any jurisdiction, United States Circuit Judge Taft,
in reversing a District Court decision which had held that a
stipulation to pay attorney's fees destroyed the negotiability
of an otherwise negotiable instrument, since the stipulation
rendered the amount due uncertain, stated "the authorities
are in such hopeless conflict that we are unable to select that
view which seems to us most consistent with the general
character of such instruments." It is set out in Judge Taft's
opinion that the agreement to pay attorney's fees could only
10 Colley v. Summers-Parrott Hardware Co., 119 Va. 439, 89 S. E. 906, Ann.
Cas. 1917 D, 375 (1916).
11 Raleigh County Bank v. J. H. Poteet, 74 W. Va. 511, 82 S. E. 332, L. R.
A. 1915 B 928; Ann. Cas. 1917 D 359 (1914).
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become operative after the instrument had been dishonored
as it is not usual or necessary to employ attorneys to collect
instruments before they are due and only such attorneys'
fees could be charged against a party as were incurred after
dishonor. As supporting the view the opinion cited cases from
Kentucky, Iowa, Kansas, Illinois, Arkansas, Nebraska, Loui-
siana and Montana and then concludes: "The contrary de-
sisions in Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Missouri, South
Carolina, North Carolina, California, Pennsylvania, Mary-
land, and Michigan it would be useless to consider or to
attempt to distinguish." 12
In discussing provisions as to attorney's fees another Fed-
eral court has stated: "We have no evidence in this record
on the subject, and need none, for we are informed by a great
body of judicial decisions for at least half a century it has
been customary in nearly every state in the Union to incor-
porate such provisions in negotiable paper. This practice
has been so general and so long continued that the court it-
self may take judicial notice of it." 13
EFFECT OF AN EARLY INDIANA STATUTE
While Indiana has adopted the view in favor of the valid-
ity of the provision, we should note a statute in effect in
such state. In 1875, thirty-seven years before the adoption
of the Negotiable Instruments Law in Indiana, a statute was
passed in Indiana, providing that, "Any and all agreements
to pay attorney fees, depending upon any condition therein
set forth, and made part of any bill of exchange, acceptance,
draft, promissory note, or other written evidence of indebt-
edness, are hereby declared illegal and void: Provided, That
nothing in this section shall be construed as applying to con-
tracts made previous to the taking effect of this act. (Acts
1875, ch. 3, Sec. 1, p. 4.)" '4
12 Farmers' National Bank v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 326 S. C. C. A. 1 (1892).
13 Cudahy Packing Co. v. State National Bank, 67 N. S. C. C. A. 662, 134
Fed. 538 (C. C. A.) (1904).
14 Bum's Ind. Stat. Ann., § 19-1918 (1933).
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This statute was upheld the next year after its enactment
in the case of Churchman v. Martin where it was held that
a stipulation in a note for payment of ten percent attorney's
fees, if suit should be instituted on the note, was invalid. So
we see that such statute applies where express conditions are
set forth in the instrument. 5
But it should be noted that two conditions are clearly and
unequivocally required to bring a case within the Indiana
statute, first, the agreement to pay attorney's fees must de-
pend upon a condition and, second, the condition must be
The legislative history of this act is interesting. It, was introduced at the 49th
Session of the General Assembly as House Bill 66 by Representative Harper and
read first time on January 13, 1875; it passed in the House on February 1, 1875,
and passed in the Senate March 5, 1875. (Journal p. 1109). In its passage it was
amended with a proviso as follows: "Provided, that nothing in this section shall
be construed as applying to contracts made previous to the taking effect of this
act." The Act was approved by Governor Thomas A. Hendricks, March 10, 1875,
and took effect at once. It was published in Acts of 1875, page 4, and later in 1
R. S. Indiana 1876, page 149.
Because of a disagreement between the Senate and House of Representatives
over the Revenue and Appropriation bills a special session of the Legislature was
called by Governor Thomas A. Hendricks on Tuesday, March 8, 1875, to con-
vene on March 9- So the Governor signed the act after the adjournment of the
Regular Session.
The Title of the Act as passed is:
"An Act declaring agreements to pay attorney's fees contained in any bill of
exchange, acceptance, draft, promissory note, or other written evidence of indebted-
ness, illegal and void, and declaring an emergency."
It will thus be noted that the title is broader than the body of the Act as the
latter covers only instruments "to pay attorney's fees, depending upon any con-
dition therein set forth and made a part" of the instrument.
A case construing this statute came up in the Supreme Court of Judicature
of the State of Indiana (now known as the Supreme Court of Indiana), in the
November Term 1876 on notes executed on March 18, 1875, that is, eight days
after the Act was enacted. The case is reported in 54 Indiana Reports, page 380,
entitled, Churchman v. Martin. The most noted attorneys in Indiana at that time
appeared in this case and the statute was sustained and has been ever since. The
distinguished attorneys were Benjamin Harrison, Cyrus C. Hines, Win. H. H.
Miller, Conrad Baker, Oscar B. Hord and Abram W. Hendricks. They were op-
posed by Clarence A. Buskirk. Harrison later became United States Senator and
President of the United States; Miller, Attorney General of the United States;
Baker then was an Ex-Governor of Indiana, Hines, Ex-Judge of Circuit Court,
Hord and Buskirk were Attorneys-General of Indiana. Hendricks, leader of Marion
County bar and partner of his cousin, the Governor, and the latter became Vice
President of the United States.
The principal of the five notes involved in this case was a total of $665.00.
15 Koons v. Davis, 84 Ind. 387 (1882); Churchman v. Martin, 54 Ind. 380
(1876).
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set forth in the instrument; 6 however, a void stipulation for
attorney's fees in such cases does not invalidate the note and
consequently a demurrer to a complaint on the note does
not bring in issue the validity of the stipulation.1"
Does the statute apply to implied conditions as well as
express conditions? This question must be answered in the
negative. The provisions of the Indiana Statute only em-
brace such agreements to pay attorney's fees as depend upon
conditions therein set forth, and not to such as might have
some implied conditions;18 the agreement, "agree to pay
attorney's fees for collecting the same," falls within the lat-
ter class of agreements and is, consequently, not prohibited
by the statutory provisions of the Indiana Statute. 9
As to an unconditional promise to pay attorney's fees it
has long been settled, by a long line of cases that such an un-
conditional promise is valid so that in a suit upon such note
the judgment must include such attorney's fees.2"
INDIANA DECISIONS PRIOR TO ADOPTION OF THE
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW.
Prior to the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law
in Indiana in 1913, it was held that the question of attor-
ney's fees was a question of damages. From cases decided
prior to the adoption in Indiana, we quote:
"The holder of a note can only recover the amount as
attorney's fees that he agrees to pay his attorneys, so if the
holder has agreed with his attorneys for. smaller fees than
provided in the note, such agreement will enure to the bene-
16 Churchman v. Martin, 54 Ind. 380 (1876).
17 Maynard v. Mier, 85 Ind. 317 (1882).
18 Tuley v. McClung, 67 Ind. 10 (1879).
19 Tuley v. McClung, 67 Ind. 10 (1879).
20 Harvey v. Baldwin, 124 Ind. 59, 24 N. E. 347, 26 N. E. 222 (1890);
Mathews v. Norman, 42 Ind. 176 (1873); Braun v. Barber, 59 Ind. 533 (1877);
Sinker, Davis & Co. v. Fletcher, 61 Ind. 276 (1878); Smock v. Ripley, 62 Ind.
81 (1878); Garver v. Pontious, 66 Ind. 191 (1879); Tuley v. McClung, 67 Ind.
10 (1879); Fitch v. Nat. Bank, 97 Ind. 211 (1884); Churchman v. Martin, 54
Ind. 381 (1876); Brown v. Barber, 59 Ind. 533 (1877); Easley v. Deer, 69 Ind.
App. 264, 121 N. E. 542 (1919).
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fit of the maker and will limit the amount of the holder's re-
covery on account of attorney's fees." 21
"The stipulation for the payment of attorney's fees only
becomes operative when expenses have been actually and
necessarily incurred in the employment of an attorney for
the enforcement of collection, consequent upon the failure
of the payor to keep his engagement, and then only to the
extent of the expense actually paid or to be paid, or rea-
sonably chargeable." 22
"An unconditional promise to pay attorney's fees is
valid." 23
"As the note provides for the payment of attorney's fees
it was enough to allege the breach of the contract, and state
the damages generally; for where damages are expressly
provided for in a contract they need not be laid as special
damages." 24
"Whether or not the holder of a note is an attorney and
competent to prosecute the action on the note is not material
as one is not bound to be his own attorney, and this ancient
rule of the law is stingingly expressed in an old familiar
adage" (meaning, of course that one who has himself as a
client has a fool for a lawyer).
"It is immaterial whether the attorney holder of a note
did or did not assist the attorney employed by him to prose-
cute the action on the note. He had a right to assist him, and
the fact that he may have done so can not diminish the com-
pensation of the attorney actually employed." 25
RULE ESTABLISHED BY HIGHEST COURT IN INDIANA
AS TO PROMISSORY NOTES IN 1858.
An agreement to pay attorney's fees for the collection of a
note providing for the payment of the same by the maker in
21 Goss v. Bowen, 104 Ind. 207 (1885); Harvey v. Baldwin, 124 Ind. 59,
24 N. E. 347, 206 N. E. 222 (1889); Kennedy v. Richardson, 70 Ind. 524 (1880).
22 Goss v. Bowen, 104 Ind. 207 (1885).
28 Harvey v. Baldwin, 124 Ind. 59, 24 N. E. 347, 26 N. E. 222 (1889).
24 Harvey v. Baldwin, 124 Ind. 59, 24 N. E. 347, 26 N. E. 222 (1889).
25 Harvey v. Baldwin, 124 Ind. 59, 26 N. E. 222 (1889).
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the event of his failure to pay the debt according to the
terms of the note, he would pay the attorney's fees for its
collection, did not render the contract usurious. The Indiana
court in 1858 stated that it was optional with the maker
"whether he should become liable to pay the expenses of
collecting the debt. That liability could only result from his
own default. And evidently, when a party agrees to indem-
nify another against the consequences of his own act, he can-
not complain if the contract is enforced against him. The
agreement in the case is reasonable, and there is certainly
no good reason why an agreement on the part of the debtor
to pay an expense resulting necessarily from his own act
should not be held valid in law." 2
In 1873 the court stated that an agreement to pay reason-
able attorney's fees on a promissory note, if the holder is re-
quired to resort to legal proceedings to collect the note, is
valid.
2 7
And in a decision handed down by Indiana's highest court
in 1869 appears the following statement:
"It is questioned here whether the stipulation for attor-
neys' fees was valid. It is argued that it was an indirect meth-
od of taking usury. We do not so regard it. A stipulation
whereby the debtor agrees to be liable for reasonable attor-
neys' fees, in the event that his failure to pay the debt shall
compel the creditor to resort to legal proceedings to collect
his demand, is not only not usurious, but is so eminently just
that there should be no hestitation in enforcing it." 28
RULE ESTABLISHED IN INDIANA AS TO BILLS
OF EXCHANGE IN 1867.
In the year 1867, the highest court in Indiana in a certain
case stated:
28 Billingsley v. Dean, 11 Ind. 331 (1858).
27 Mathews v. Norman Administrators, 42 Ind. 176 (1873).
28 Smith v. Silvers, 32 Ind. 321 (1869).
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"The bill on its face contained an agreement to pay at-
torney's fees, and when accepted, the acceptor comes under
an absolute obligation to pay the bill according to its tenor;
he holds the place of the maker of a note. So the stipulation
for the payment of attorney's fees became a part of the con-
tract of the acceptor." 29
And in 1870 our highest court in Indiana declared:
"A stipulation in a bill of exchange for the payment of
attorneys' fees for collecting the bill is not usurious; and in
a suit on the bill, the drawers, acceptors, and indorsers will
be liable for reasonable attorneys' fees." "
NEGOTIABILITY IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS PRIOR TO THE
ADOPTION OF THE UNIFORM LAW.
The weight of authority and better reasoning, prior to the
adoption of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, was
that the negotiability of a note was not, in the absence of a
special statute, destroyed by a stipulation therein for pay-
ment of attorney fees, or for the payment of a reasonable
attorney's fee, or for the payment of a specified sum or per-
cent as an attorney fee, in the event it became necessary to
place the note into the hands of an attorney for collection or
to bring suit for collection of the note. 1
Many courts held the note negotiable in those cases in
which the provision was merely for a reasonable attorney
fee, no amount or percentage being specified; 82 and the
29 Smith v. The Muncie National Bank, 29 Ind. 158 (1867).
80 The First National Bank of Martinsville v. Canatsey, 34 Ind. 149 (1870).
31 L. R. A. 1916 B 678.
82 Hughitt v. Johnson, 28 Fed. 865 (1886); Farmers' Nat. Bk. v. Sutton Mfg.
Co., 3 C. C. A. 1, 52 Fed. 191, 17 L. R. A. 595 (1892); First Nat. Bk. v. Slaughter,
98 Ala. 602, 14 So. 545 (1893); Orr v. Sparkman, 120'Ala. 9, 23 So. 829 (1897);
Dumas v. Peoples' Bk., 146 Ala. 226, 40 So. 964 (1906); Lauferty v. Johnson,
17 II. App. 549 (1885); Pitzer v. McCune, 152 In. App. 144 (1909); Stoneman v.
Pyle, 35 Ind. 103, 9 Am. Rep. 637 (1871); Proctor v. Baldwin, 82 Ind. 370 (1882);
Nicely v. Commercial Bk., 15 Ind. App. 563, 44 N. E. 572 (1896) (Costs of collec-
tion); Sperry v. Horr, 32 Ia. 184 (1871); Seaton v. Scoville, 18 Kan. 433, 26
Am. Rep. 779 (1877); Gaar v. Louisville Bkg. Co., 11 Bush (Ky.) 180, 21 Am.
Rep. 209 (1874); Clifton v. Bk. of Aberdeen, 75 Miss. 929, 23 So. 394 (1898);
Creston Nat. Bk. v. Salmon, 117 Mo. App. 506, 93 S. W. 288 (1906); Bk. of Coin-
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courts held likewise in cases containing .a provision for a
specified percentage or amount as attorney fees, if suit be
instituted thereon."s
merce v. Fuqua, 11 Mont. 285, 28 P. 291 (1891).; Heard v. Dubuque County Bk., 8
Neb. 10, 30 Am. Rep. 811 (1878) ; Haslach v. Wolf, 66 Neb. 600, 92 N. W. 574, 60 L.
R. A. 434 (1902) ; Benn v. Kutzchan, 24 Ore. 28, 32 P. 763 (1893) ; Oppenheimer v.
Farmers' and M. Bk., 97 Tenn. 19, 36 S. W. 705 (1896); Garretson v. Purdy, 3
Dak. 178, 14 N. W. 100 (1882); Roads v. Webb, 91 Me. 406, 40 A. 128 (1898);
Maryland Fertilizing and Mfg. Co. v. Newman, 60 Md. 584, 45 Am. Rep. 750
(1883); Altman v. Rittershofer, 68 Mich. 287, 36 N. W. 74 (1888); Altman v.
Fowler, 70 Mich. 57, 37 N. W. 708 (1888); Strawberry Point Bk. v. Lee, 117
Mich. 122, 75 N. W. 444 (1898); Jones v. Radotz, 27 Minn. 240, 6 N. W. 800
(1880); Deering v. Thom, 29 Minn. 120, 12 N. W. 350 (1882); Smith v. First
State Bk., 95 Minn. 496, 104 N. W. 369 (1905); Samstag v. Conley, 64 Mo. 476
(1877); McCoy v. Green, 83 Mo. 626 (1884); Clark v. Barnes, 58 Mo. App. 667
(1894); Law v. Crawford, 67 Mo. App. 150 (1896) (provision for confession of
judgment for amount of unpaid costs and attorney fees.); Pace v. Gilbert School,
118 Mo. App. 369, 93 S. W. 1124 (1906); Buck v. Harris, 125 Mo. App. 365, 102
S. W. 640 (1907); Davis v. McColl, 179 Mo. App. 198, 166 S. W. 1113 (1914);
American Machinery and Expert Co. v. Druge Bros., 82 Vt. 476, 74 A. 84 (1909);
Morgan v. Edwards, 53 Wis. 599, 11 N. W. 21 (1881); Peterson v. Stoughton State
Bk., 78 Wis. 113, 47 N. W. 368 (1890).
3 Howenstein v. Barnes, 5 Dill 482, Fed. Cas. No. 6,786 (1879) (10%);
Adams v. Addington, 4 Woods 389, 16 Fed. 89 (1882) (10%); Schlesinger v.
Arline, 31 Fed. 648 (1887) (Payment of all costs including ten percent attorney
fees) ; State Nat. BIL v. Cudahy Packing Co., 126 Fed. 543, aff'd 134 Fed. 538
(1904) (10%); Montgomery v. Crossthwait, 90 Ala. 553, 8 So. 498 (1890) (All
costs of collection not less than ten percent); Overton v. Matthews, 35 Ark. 146,
37 Am. Rep. 9 (1879) (10% attorney fee); Trader v. Chidester, 41 Ark. 242, 48
Am. Rep. 38 (1883) (10%); White-Wilson-Drew Co. v. Egelhoff, 96 Ark. 105,
131 S. W. 208 (1910) (10%); Cowing v. Cloud, 16 Colo. App. 326, 65 P. 417
(1901) (Stated sum as attorney fee); Stapleton v. Louisville Bkg. Co., 95 Ga. 802,
23 S. E. 81 (1895) (10%); Nickerson v. Sheldon, 33 Ill. 372, 85 Am. Dec. 280
(1864) (10%); Nickerson v. Babcock, 33 Ill. 374 (1864) (10%); Dorsey v. Wolff,
142 Ill. 589, 32 N. E. 495, 18 L. R. A. 428 (1892); Gehlbach v. Carlinville Nat.
Bk., 83 Ill. App. 129 (1898) (Confession of Judgment for amount of note and five
percent attorney fee); Harris v. Pate, 7 Ind. Terr. 493, 104 S. W. 812 (1907)
(10%); Shenandoah Nat. Bk. v. Marsh, 89 Ia.. 273, 56 N. W. 458 (1893) (10%) ;
Dietrich v. Bayhi, 23 La. Ann. 767 (1871) (10%); Clark v. Porter, 90 Mo. App.
143 (1901) (10% attorney fee did not destroy negotiability under Arkansas law);
Roberts v. Snow, 27 Neb. 425, 43 N. W. 241 (1889) (10%); Mackintosh v.
Gibbs, 81 N. J. L. 577, 80 A. 554 (1911) (6%); White v. Harris, 69 S. C. 65,
48 S. E. 41 (1903) (10%); First Nat. Bk. v. Badhorn, 86 S. C. 170, 68 S. E. 536
(1910) (Payment of all expenses in case of suit for collection of note, and if neces-
sary to employ attorney to collect note, to pay sum not exceeding 10% for fees) ;
Smith v. Pickhorn, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 326, 28 S. W. 565 (1894) (10%); Chicago
Cottage Organ Co. v. Waddell, 35 S. W. 408 (1896) (10%); Elmore v. Rugely,
48 Tex. Civ. App. 456, 107 S. W. 151 (1908) (10%); Salisbury v. Stewart, 15
Utah 308, 49 P. 777 (1897); But see Lippincott v. Rich, 22 Utah 196, 61 P. 526
(1900), wherein the opposite conclusion was reached concerning a note calling for
reasonable attorney fees only. First Nat. Bk. v. Gay, 63 Mo. 33, 21 Am. Rep. 430
(1876) (10%); First Nat. Bk. v. Marlow, 71 Mo. 618 (1880) (10%); Storr v.
Wakefield, 71 Mo. 622 (1880) (10%); First Nat. Bk. v. Gay, 71 Mo. 627 (1880)
(10%); First Nat. Bk. v. Jacobs, 73 Mo. 35 (1880) (10%); Creasy v. Gray, 88
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The reason why the ordinary provision for an attorney's
fee did not destroy negotiability is given by Magruder, J.,
in Dorsey v. Wolff,3"" as follows: "The promise to pay the at-
torney's fee is a promise to do something after the note ma-
tures. It does not affect the character of the note before or
up to the time of its maturity, either as to certainty in the
amount to be paid, or definiteness in the description of the
person to whom the payment is to be made." The same rea-
son is given in a leading Tennessee case 11 where the court
said: "Upon a careful review of the authorities, we can per-
ceive no reason why a note otherwise imbued with all the at-
tributes of negotiability is rendered non-negotiable by a stip-
ulation which is entirely inoperative until after the maturity
of the note and its dishonor by the maker. The amount to be
paid is certain during the currency of the note as a negotiable
instrument, and it only becomes uncertain after it ceases to
be negotiable by the default of the maker in its payment. It
is eminently just that the creditor who has incurred an ex-
pense in the collection of the debt should be reimbursed by
the debtor by whom the action was rendered necessary and
the expense entailed." And in still another case it is stated:
"Such a stipulation adds to the value of paper, has a ten-
dency to lower the rate of discount on it, not only because it
promises less expensive collection, but bears evidence of a
greater degree of confidence on the part of the maker in his
ability to pay without suit .... Looking to the spirit as well
as the letter, of a time-honored definition, certainly 'a cour-
ier without luggage' is none the less efficient for all purposes
by reason of having something about him with which to pay
Mo. App. 454 (1901) (10%); Cotton v. John Deere Plow Co., 14 Okla. 605, 78
P. 321 (1904) ($10 and 10% of amount collected, if suit); Sullins v. Farmers
Exch. Bk., 17 Okla. 419, 87 P. 857 (1906) (10%); Clowers v. Snowden, 21 Okla.
476, 96 P. 596 (1908) (If collected by an attorney, $10); Mitchell v. Altus State
Bk., 32 Okla. 628, 122 P. 666 (1912) (10%); American Nat. Bk. v. Halsell, 43
Okla. 126, 140 P. 399 (1914) (10%); Adams v. Thurmond, 48 Okla. 189, 149 P.
1141 (1915) (10%); Woods v. North, 84 P. 407, 24 Am. Rep. 201 (1877) (5%).
83G 142 MII. 589, 32 N. E. 395, 34 Am. St. Rep. 99, 18 L. R. A. 428 (1892).
34 Oppenheimer v. Farmers' and Merchants' Bank, 97 Tenn. 19, 36 S. W.
705, 56 Am. St. Rep. 778, 33 L. R. A. 767 (1896).
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his reckoning." " The same reasons given by these courts
are also given in other cases, 86 and in the leading text
books.1
7
Under the minority rule, prior to the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law, a stipulation in a note for payment of an
attorney fee, or a specified sum, or percent, as an attorney
fee, in the event it became necessary to place the note in
the hands of an attorney for collection or to bring suit for
that purpose, destroyed the negotiability.8
The reason given by these courts was that a provision for
the costs of collection or attorney's fees rendered the sum
payable uncertain and the instruments non-negotiable. 9
But as set out above, prior to the adoption of the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law, the decided majority of juris-
dictions held that a stipulation in a promissory note for the
payment of an attorney's fee or other costs for collection
was valid4 0
The reason as stated in a Georgia case was as follows:
"The stipulation as to costs and attorney's fees is not a
part of the main engagement, but relates to the remedy in
case of failure to comply with the contract, and is intended
to compensate for the expense resulting from its breach. It
does not become effective unless there is a failure to pay at
the time specified; and it cannot then affect its negotiability,
for negotiability in the full commercial sense ceases at ma-
turity. It seems paradoxical to hold that instruments evident-
35 Heard v. Dubuque Bank, 8 Neb. 10 (1878).
36 Sperry v. Horr, 32 Iowa 184 (1871).
37 Beutel, Brannan's Negotiable Instruments Law, Sth Ed., p. 113; Daniel,
Negotiable Instruments, 7th Ed. by T. H. Calvert, vol. 1, p. 79; Ogden, Nego-
tiable Instruments, 4th Ed. pp. 72, 73.
38 L. R. A. 1916-B 682.
39 Kendall v. Parker, 103 Cal. 319, 37 P. 401 (1894) (Changed by Statute,
1916); Roads v. Webb, 91 Me. 406, 40 A. 128 (1898); Annotation: 3 L. R. A.
51, 4 Am. Cases 264 (1889).
40 Raleigh County Bank v. Poteet, 74 W. Va. 511, 82 S. E. 332 (1914); An-
not. Cas. 1917-D 359, Note L. R. A. 1015-B 928; Mathews v. Norman, 42 Ind. 176
(1873); Smith v. Silvers, 32 Ind. 321 (1869); Billingsley v. Dean, 11 Ind. 331
(1858).
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ly framed as bills and notes are not negotiable during their
currency, because when they cease to be current they con-
tain a stipulation to defray the expenses of collection. So
far from tending to check the circulation of the paper, such
a provision adds to its value and thus renders it more avail-
able for commercial purposes." "'
NEGOTIABILITY ,SUBSEQUENT TO THE ADOPTION
OF THE UNIFORM LAW.
As we have noted the great weight of authority today
sustains the view that negotiability is not affected by this
provision and the Negotiable Instruments Law has estab-
lished in most jurisdictions a uniform rule that the stipula-
tion, as to attorney's fees in negotiable instruments, shall not
affect the negotiability; " so we see that a provision for pay-
ment of attorney's fees, in case the note is not paid at ma-
turity, does not destroy the negotiability of the note; 11 but
what is the effect if nothing is said in the note about the
maturity of the note? As to this it has been stated that
where provision for attorney's fees in a note failed to limit
their payment expressly to the event of default at maturity,
the note is not rendered non-negotiable since no attorney's
fees or other costs of collection can accrue when a note is
paid promptly at maturity as the reasonable construction
of the provision is that the maker agrees to pay a reasonable
attorney's fee if the note is collected by an attorney after
maturity.4
The former rule in Minnesota and some other minority
states that a provision for attorney's fees rendered a note
non-negotiable was abrogated by the Negotiable Instruments
Law.45 And it has been held that negotiability is not de-
41 Stapleton v. Louisville Banking Co., 95 Ga. 802, 23 S. E. 81 (1895).
42 Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, Sec. 2 (5).
48 Gerrish v. Atlantic Ice and Coal Co., 80 F. 2d 648 (1935); Anaheim Nat.
Bank v. Dolph, 201 Cal. 17, 255 P. 184 (1927).
44 Adolph Ramish Inc. v. Woodruff, 87 Cal. Dec. 75, 28 P. 2d 360 (1934).
45 § 2; Goehard v. Folstad, 156 Minn. 453, 195 N. W. 281 (1923).
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stroyed by a provision for attorney's fees even though it
involves a contingent agreement.4"
On the other hand, an agreement to pay costs, charges,
and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees in any
litigation arising from or connected with the note, has been
held to embrace so many factors as to leave indefinite the
amount of the note and therefore to render it non-negotia-
ble.47
In most states which hold the provision unenforceable, it
was properly held that the provision did not prevent the in-
strument from being a bill or note; 48 and in the jurisdictions
which still hold a provision for costs of collection of attor-
ney's fee to be contrary to public policy the provision is re-
garded as a nullity but does n~t affect the negotiability of
the note,49 and the Federal courts have uniformly held that
provisions for costs of collection and attorney's fees do not
destroy negotiability,50 and in Canada, negotiability is not
affected by such a provision."
The effect of the provision of the Negotiable Instruments
Law that "the sum payable is a sum certain, within the
meaning of the law, although it is to be paid with costs of
collection or attorney's fee in case payment is not made at
maturity" is that the majority of the states holding such a
stipulation valid before the Negotiable Instruments Law was
enacted, continued to adhere to the rule that such a stipula-
tion is valid.52
46 Pugh v. Dawson, 95 Cal. App. 505, 293 P. 39 (,1930).
47 Nussenfeld v. Smith, 110 Conn. 438, 148 A. 388 (1930).
48 L. R. A. 1916 B, 675, 677, 2 A. L. R. 139.
49 Holly Grove Bank v. Sudbury, 121 Ark. 59, 180 S. W. 470 (1915); Com-
mercial Trust Co. v. Snelling, 113 Kan. 272, 214 P. 882 (1923); Sharpe v. Shoen-
berger, 44 S. D. 402, 184 N. W. 209 (1921).
50 Wilson Sewing Machine Co. v. Moreno, 7 Fed. 806 (1879); Adams v.
Addington, 16 Fed. 89 (1883); Schlesinger v. Arline, 31 Fed. 648 (1887); Farmers'
Nat. Bank v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 52 Fed. 191, 17 L. R. A. 595 (1892).
51 Davis v. Butler (Man.) 7 West L. R. 85.
52 Monroe v. Staser, 6 Ind. App. 364, 33 N. E. 665 (1893); Heating &
Plumbing Finance Corp. v. Third Ave. Corp., 147 Misc. 700, 264 N. Y. S. 505
(1932); Citizens' Nat. Bank of Orange, Va. v. Waugh, 78 F. 2d 325, 100 A. L. R.
939 (C. C. A. of W. Va., 1935); Curtis v. Wasem, 96 Cal. App. 604, 274 P. 607
(1929).
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So where an instrument contains a stipulation for "a rea-
sonable attorney's fee," or for "an attorney's fee," or for
"costs of collection," or similar stipulations, such stipula-
tions have been held valid,53 and the majority of cases also
sustain the validity of stipulations in notes for a specified
sum or per cent, as attorney's fees.5"
The general reason given by the courts for upholding such
a provision in a note is that such a contract for the payment
of attorney's fees is merely a contract of indemnity;" its
purpose is to make the holder of the note secure against any
liability which he may incur in the event that he might be
compelled to employ an attorney to enforce collection of his
debt, and is effective only in case of a breach on the part of
the maker, and by reason thereof the holder of the notes has
necessarily incurred the liability for the attorney's fees. The
courts frequently state that such stipulations in notes for
the payment of attorney's fees are contracts of indemnity
purely and cannot be made a cloak for speculation and prof-
it by the holder."
The provision of the Negotiable Instruments Law has
been held to give implied legislative sanction to such a stipu-
lation. In the case of Florence Oil Company v. Hiawatha
Company,57 the court stated:
53 Hovey v. Edmison, 3 Dak. 449, 22 N. W. 594 (1885); Ray v. Pease, 97
Ga. 618, 25 S. E. 360 (1895); Easley v. Deer, 69 Ind. App. 264, 121 N. E. 542
(1919); Tyler v. Walker, 101 Tenn. 306, 47 S. W. 424 (1898); Harvey v. Bald-
win, 124 Ind. 59, 24 N. E. 347 (1890); Lindley v. Sullivan, 133 Ind. 588, 32 N. E.
738 (1892) ; Shoup v. Snepp, 22 Ind. 30, 53 N. E. 189 (1899).
54 Wood v. Winship Machine Co., 83 Ala. 424, 3 So. 757 (1888); Alexander
v. McDow, 108 Cal. 25, 41 P. 24 (1895); Byers v. Bellan-Price Inv. Co., 10 Colo.
App. 74, 50 P. 368 (1897); Keenan v. Blue, 240 Ill. 177, 88 N. E. 553 (1909);
Goss v. Bowen, 104 Ind. 207, 2 N. E. 704 (1885); Rouyer v. Miller, 16 Ind. App.
519, 44 N. E. 51 (1896); Campbell v. Worman, 58 Minn. 561, 60 N. W. 668
(1894); Salisbury v. Stewart, 15 Utah 308, 49 P. 777 (1897).
55 Morris Plan Co. of R. I. v. Whitman, 51 R. I. 24, 150 A. 610 (1930) ; Wil-
liams v. Flowers, 90 Ala. 136, 7 So. 439 (1890); Annotation: 1 L. R. A. 546, Note
L. R. A. 1915-B, 930, 933, 943 (1919); Judson v. Romaine, 8 Ind. App. 390, 35
N. E. 912 (1893); St. Joseph County Sav. Bank v. Randall, 37 Ind. App. 402,
76 N. E. 1012 (1905); First Nat. Bank v. Robinson, 104 Tex. 166, 135 S. W. 372
(1911); Kennedy v. Richardson, 70 Ind. 524 (1880).
56 Rouyer v. Miller, 16 Ind. App. 519, 44 N. E. 51, 45 N. E. 674 (1896).
57 55 Colo. 378, 135 P. 454 (1913).
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"On the subject of stipulations in notes for attorney's fees
there is a wide variance in the adjudicated cases. In some
jurisdictions it is held that they are against public policy,
and therefore void. There is nothing in our statutes which
will render this doctrine applicable. On the contrary, im-
pliedly, at least, the general assembly has recognized that
they are valid, by providing in the Negotiable Instruments
Law, section 5052, rev. ed. Mill's Statutes, that a note pro-
viding for costs of collection or an attorney's fee, in case
payment shall not be made at maturity, does not affect its
negotiability."
In the jurisdictions heretofore holding a stipulation in a
note to pay attorney's fees or other costs of collection to be
void it is held that the Negotiable Instruments Law does
not, by its provision that such a stipulation shall not affect
negotiability, render such a stipulation valid.58 The logic
of such a rule is that the negotiability of paper is one thing,
and the policy of the state as to usury, penalties and public
policy quite another, and that the statute deals with the
former and not the latter. It says nothing about usury,
penalties or public policy. Its purpose was to establish uni-
formity in the quality, characteristics, and incidents of
negotiable paper and to extend the principle of negotiability;
but it assumed the validity of the paper. In other words, it
assumed the paper to be such as the law permits the parties
to make and allows courts to enforce. But if the law of the
forum does not allow such a stipulation, the insertion of
such a provision is a nullity even though it does not affect
the negotiability of the instrument.59
In the minority states three main objectives have been
made to the validity of the provision, and all have found
judicial sanction in different states. First, an objection is that
58 Holly Grove Bank v. Sudbury, 121 Ark. 59, 180 S. W. 470 (1915); Leach
v. Urschel, 112 Kan. 629, 212 P. 111 (1923); C. I. T. Corp. v. Studebaker Sales
of Ky., 251 Ky. 349, 65 S. W. 2d 84 (1933); Miller v. Kyle, 85 0. S. 186, 97 N. E.
372 (1911); Raleigh County Bank v. Poteet, 74 W; Va. 511, 82 S. E. 332 (1914).
59 Colley v. Summers-Parrott Hardware Co., 119 Va. 439,89 S. E. 906 (1916).
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the provision is usurious.6" The second objection is that the
provision is a penalty,61 and the third objection is that the
provision violates public policy."2
Are these three objections sound? First, is the provision
usurious? If the provision is merely to defray expense of
collection caused by the debtor's default, it is not usurious.
A stipulation whereby the debtor agrees to be liable for rea-
sonable attorney's fees, in the event that his failure to pay
the debt shall compel the creditor to resort to legal proceed-
ings to collect his demand, is not only not usurious, but is
so eminently just that there should be no hesitation in en-
forcing it;6" when a party agrees to indemnify another
against the consequences of his own act, he cannot complain
if his contract is enforced against him. The agreement is
reasonable, and there is certainly no good reason why an
Agreement on the part of the debtor to pay an expense
resulting necessarily from his own act should not be valid
in law. Second, is the provision a penalty? The weight
of authority is that such is not a penalty but a contract
of indemnity; the maker does not have to pay attorney's
fees unless he defaults on the note, and then he pays
the amount equal to the expense of the payee in so col-
lecting such note; so we see that the maker is not pe-
nalized but that he only indemnifies. Third, is the provi-
sion contrary to public policy? Public policy is properly a
subject for the legislature and not for the courts. The legis-
lature has declared its public policy in the Negotiable In-
60 In re Beckenhaupt, 21 Ohio N. P. N. S. 7; C. I. T. Corporation v. Stude-
baker Sales of Ky., 251 Ky. 349, 65 S. W. 2d 84 (1933); Myer v. Hart, 40 Mich.
517, 29 Am. R. 553 (1879); White-Wilson-Drew Co. v. Egelhoff, 96 Ark. 105, 131
S. W. 208 (1910); Exchange Bank v. Apalachain Land etc. Co., 128 N. C. 193, 38
S. E. 813 (1901); Annotation: L. R. A. 1915-B, 136, 146 (1932).
61 Boozer v. Anderson, 42 Ark. 167 (1883); Arden Lumber Co. v. Hender-
son, 83 Ark. 244, 103 S. W. 185 (1907); White v. Egelhoff, 96 Ark. 105, 131 S. W.
208 (1910).
62 Campen Bros. v. Stewart, 106 W. Va. 247, 145 S. E. 381 (1928).
68 Billingsley v. Dean, 11 Ind. 331 (1858); The First Nat. Bank of Martins-
ville v. Canatsey, 34 Ind. 149 (1870); Smith v. Silvers, 32 Ind. 321 (1869).
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struments Law; so a provision for attorney's fees is not
against public policy. 4
"The Oregon court has attained a more or less doubtful
distinction by adopting a minority-majority-view, all of its
own in this field. The first case in which the court had oc-
casion to consider the validity and effect of a provision for
attorney's fees appears to have been Peyser v. Cole (1883)
11 Ore. 39. In that case a provision for a 'reasonable' fee was
involved. The court there said that the trend of authority 'is
in favor of the validity of such engagements, subject to the
general supervisory power of the court as to their bona fides
and reasonableness. Whether a specified amount or per cent,
or only a reasonable fee is provided for by the stipulation,
we have no doubt of either the power or duty of the court
where the question of good faith and reasonableness is pre-
sented ... .' Shortly thereafter the case of Balfour v. Davis,
(1886) 14 Ore. 47, 12 Pac. 89 was presented; here the pro-
vision was for 20% attorney's fee. The court then asserted
(the opinion was written by one of the justices who con-
curred in Peyser v. Cole) that a set fee is in violation of the
rule of just compensation and against public policy, that a
court cannot be expected to enforce an unconscionable bar-
gain, and that the court did not feel disposed to extend the
holding in Peyser v. Cole. The court went on to declare that
it could not allow a reasonable fee where a set fee had been
provided for because, 'This, in effect, is asking the court
to make a contract for the parties that they have not made
for themselves, and which we do not consider we are au-
thorized to do. We must either enforce the contract as it ap-
pears, as to this item, or to decline to enforce it.' It is to be
noted that other courts have not found themselves restrained
by such scruples nor under the necessity of setting forth such
apparently ephemeral objections." 65
64 2 Virginia Law Reg. 321 (1841); Parkham v. Pullman, 5 Coldw. 497
(Tenn., 1868).
65 Carl G. Helm, Bills and Notes, Provision for Attorneys' Fees, 17 Ore. L.
Rev. 320 (1938); Citizens Nat. Bank of Orange v. Waugh, 78 F. 2d 325, (C. C.
A.4th) (1935).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
In some states special statutes make stipulations for the
payment of attorney's fees void. Such is the case in Kansas,
North Carolina, and North Dakota and in some other states
heretofore enumerated.6"
Section 2 and subsection 5 providing that: "The sum pay-
able is a sum certain within the meaning of this act, al-
though it is to be paid with costs of collection or an attor-
ney's fee, in case payment shall not be made at maturity,"
has been changed in Nebraska by adding a provision as fol-
lows: "Provided that nothing herein contained shall be con-
strued to authorize any court to include in any judgment on
an instrument made in this state any sum for attorney's fee
or other costs not allowable in other cases." The North
Carolina Act has attached to subsection 5 the following:
"But a provision incorporated in the instrument to pay
counsel fees for collection is not enforceable, but does not
affect the other terms of the instrument or the negotiability
thereof."
In a recent Pennsylvania case under the Small Loans Act
which makes no provision for attorney's fees on promissory
notes under the act, the court states: "Since the judgment
as confessed includes a 'fee' or 'charge' in addition to inter-
est, expressly prohibited by the act, it follows the judgment
is a nullity ... By the addition of an attorney fee, the judg-
ment is so tainted with illegality as to be void on its face.
It follows that the action of the lower court in striking it
off was proper." 67
In Indiana under the Small Loan Companies Act,e"a if
any charge in excess of those permitted by the act is con-
tracted for in the contract of loan, then such loan is void.
66 Kansas Gen. Stat. 1915, § 6475; § 197, Pels Revised (N. Car.) § 2346;
§ 7791, C. L. (No. Dak.) 1913; Continental Supply Co. v. Syndicate Trust Co.,
52 N. D. 209, 202 N. W. 404 (1924).
67 Lackawanna Thrift & Loan Corporation v. Habatchnick, 20 A. 2d 903
(Pa., 1941); See also Consolidated Plan of New Jersey Inc. v. Shanholtz, 7 N. J.
Misc. 876; G. Nicotera Loan Corporation v. Gallagher, 115 Conn. 102, 160 A.
426; Smetal Corporation v. Family Loan Co., 119 Fla. 497, 161 So. 438.
67a Burns, Ind. Stat. Ann., § 18-3001, 18-3002 (1933).
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As the charge for an attorney's fee is not permitted by the
Act, such a charge is illegal and makes the loan void. We
quote from Section 18-3002 of that act as follows:
"In addition to the rate of interest or charges herein pro-
vided for no further or other charge or amount whatsoever
for examination, service, brokerage, commission, expense,
fee or bonus or other thing or otherwise shall be directly or
indirectly charged. . . . If any interest, consideration or
charges in excess of those permitted by this act are charged,
contracted for or received, the contract of loan shall be void
and the licensee shall have no right to collect or receive any
principal, interest, or charges whatsoever."
WHO MAY RECOVER ATTORNEY'S FEES?
An examination as to who may recover attorney's fees
discloses that: The right to recover attorney's fees stipu-
lated for in promissory notes passes to the endorsee with
the note;6" it runs in favor of any holder, such as an accom-
modation maker, or last indorser who has taken up the
note,6" or a pledgee suing thereon, and is generally con-
sidered as a part of the drawer's, acceptor's or indorser's
contract to pay attorney's fees to the holder. 1
In Roe v. Smytk 2 the plaintiff was the last of several in-
dorsers of a note which provided for the payment by the
maker and indorsers of reasonable attorney's fee for collec-
tion. At maturity the plaintiff paid the full amount of the
note to the holder, and subsequently recovered judgments
against the defendants. In a suit to recover a reasonable at-
68 Winn Parish Bank v. White Sulphur Co., 133 La. 282, 62 So. 907 (1913).
69 Cox v. Hagan, 125 Va. 656, 100 S. E. 666 (1919); Pease v. Syler, 78 Wash.
24, 138 P. 310 (1914).
70 Winn Parish Bank v. White Sulphur Lumber Co., 133 La. 282, 62 So.
907 (1913).
71 Bank v. Ellis, 2 Fed. 44 (1880) (Accommodation endorser); Hubbard v.
Harrison, 38 Ind. 323 (1871); Merrimon v. Parkey, 136 Tenn. 645, 191 S. W.
327 (1917); Contra: Robinson v. Aird, 43 Fla. 30, 29 So. 633 (1901); Short v.
Coffeen, 76 Ill. 245.
72 Roe v. Smyth, 300 N. Y. Supp. 1068 (1937).
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torney's fee, the complaint was dismissed by the trial court,
but the trial court was reversed by the appellate division
which held, that an agreement in a note to pay a reasonable
attorney's fee is valid and an indorser who reacquires such
note may recover against the prior indorsers in a separate
action. The benefit of such a stipulation passes with the note
so that the ultimate holder may recover on it.
In one case it was urged that the plaintiff having once
recovered on the principal obligation he could no longer sue
to recover the attorney's fees which were a part of that ob-
ligation. It was there decided that whether more than one
suit may be brought depends on the severable nature of the
contract." Severability may be predicated on the theory
that since the attorney's fee was not due when the suit was
brought recovery cannot be obtained in the same action."4
The court interpreting a certain agreement, found that there
were separate and distinct agreements, one to pay the note
on the due date, the other to pay an attorney's fee if the
note was not paid and if expenses were incurred in collecting
it. Since a reasonable fee is required, 5 and a determination
of the amount can be made only after the expenses have
been incurred and an estimate taken. It is submitted that
the court would not err in permitting this suit to be brought.7"
In connection with the question as to who may recover
attorney's fees arises the question as to who may retain
fees collected. We find that the cases generally hold that the
fees are a part of the contract and belong to the client.
Thus it is held that the attorney's fee is recoverable by the
holders, and it is a part of their cause of action, and is not a
cause of action in favor of the attorneys who might be re-
73 Bernbock v. I. Zucker Co., 148 Misc. 244, 26 N. Y. Supp. 607 (1933).
74 Dearlove v. Edwards, 166 111. 619, 46 N. E. 1081 (1897).
75 Cutten v. Mayor of N. Y., 92 N. Y. 166 (1883). "If the fee were a fixed
fee there is no reason why it cannot be included in the original action as in the
case of a stipulation for interest."
76 To the point that attorney's fees can be recovered in the action on the
note and not in a separate action see: Shugart v. Paltee, 37 Iowa 422 (1872);
Smiley v. Meier, 47 Ind. 559 (1874); Glenn v. Porter, 72 Ind. 525 (1880).
ATTORNEY'S FEES
tained by the holders to bring the suit;" 7 the client must,
however, pay the attorney whatever fees have been agreed
upon between them, or in the absence of an agreement such
fees as are just and reasonable; he is supposed to be reim-
bursed more or less for this outlay by the repayment to him
from the judgment against the defendant of the amount al-
lowed for that purpose."
In a Louisiana case "9 the court said that: "The only
sense in which it can be said that the attorney's fee stipu-
lated in a note belongs to the owner of the note is that the
owner of the note may sue for and recover the fee in his own
name when he sues on the note."
In the absence of statute or express agreement to the con-
trary, an attorney is not entitled to the attorney's fees as
taxed costs; the attorney fees become the property of his
client."0 The fact, however, that attorney's fees have been
assessed as a part of the costs, or are awarded by statute,
does not prevent the attorney from recovering for the rea-
sonable value of the services from his client.8
Apart from the question of technical estoppel or technical
logic, it seems probable that the courts will decline to permit
the client who has recovered attorney's fees upon the theory
of indemnity against his counsel's charges to retain them
for his own benefit, since he should not profit by his dis-
honesty to his debtor with the assistance of the court.8 2
LIABILITY OF SURETY, ACCEPTOR, ENDORSER AND OTHERS.
The liability of a surety, an acceptor or an endorser arises
in the cases pertaining to attorney's fees: thus a surety on a
77 Johnson v. Crossland, 34 Ind. 344 (1870); Jenkins v. Harris, 19 Tenn.
App. 113, 83 S.W. 2d 562 (1935).
78 Kenner v. Whitelock, 152 Ind. 635, 53 N. E. 232 (1899); Price, Adm., 105
Ind. 543 (1885).
19 Foundation Finance Co. v. Robbins, 179 La. 259, 153 So. 833, 836 (1934).
80 Berry v. State Bank of Otterbein, 99 Ind. App. 655, 193 N. E. 922 (1935);
Boynton v. Tarbell, 272 Mass. 142, 172 N. E. 340 (1930).
81 Boynton v. Tarbell, 272 -Mass. 142, 172 N. E. 340 (1930); Leahy v. Temp.,
214 S. W. 228 (Mo. App., 1919).
82 Annotation: 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 594, 596.
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note providing for payment for attorney's fees is ordinarily
liable therefor; 8 and the acceptor in the event a stipulation
for attorney's fees is contained in a bill of exchange, is em-
braced in the liability assumed by him.84
The authorities are divided as to the liability of an in-
dorser for attorney's fees. A few support the view that the
indorser is not liable;8" and many support the view that the
indorser is liable.86 Even where the face of the note states
the contract in the name of the maker only (and indorsers
are in no way mentioned on the face on the note) many of
the decisions hold the indorser liable for attorney's fees.8"
It has been decided in a number of well-reasoned decisions
that the indorser is liable for attorney's fees, especially where
the note on its face contains some special contract on his
part, such as that he waives presentment for payment, pro-
test, and notice of protest and non-payment of the note;88
this is on the theory that such language occurring in con-
nection with a contract for attorney's fees will be taken as
indicating that he also contracts for attorney's fees, and
that the stipulation passes with the instrument through the
transferee, and hence the indorsee may recover the fee not
only from the maker but also from the indorser and the ac-
ceptor of the bill. 9
83 McMillan v. Heard Nat. Bank of Jacksonville, 19 Ga. App. 148, 91 S. E.
235 (1917).
84 Smith v. The Muncie Nat. Bank, 29 Ind. 158 (1867).
85 Robinson v. Aird, 43 Fla. 30, 29 So. 633 (1901); Short v. Coffeen, 76 Ill.
245 (1873); Schaeffer v. Hodges, 54 Ill. 337; City Savings Bk. v. Kensington Land
Co., 37 S. W. 1037 (Tenn. App., 1896).
86 Bank of British North America v. Ellis, 2 Fed. Cas. No. 859; Hubbard
v. Harrison, 38 Ind. 323 (1871); Benn v. Kutzschan, 32 P. 763 (Ore., 1893);
Smith v. Richardson Lumber Co., 47 S. W. 386 (Tex. Civ. App., 1898); River-
side Mill Co. v. Cartersville Bk., 81 S. E. 892 (Ga., 1914); Kummer v. Lauman,
138 Ore. 514, 7 P. 2d 556 (1932).
87 Franklin v. Duncan, 182 S. W. 230 (Tenn., 1916); Martinsville v. Canatsey,
34 Ind. 149 (1870); Hubbard v. Harrison, 38 Ind. 323 (1871); Farmer's State
Bank v. Haun, 222 P. 45 (Wyo., 1924); Byers v. Investment Co-, 50 P. 368 (Colo.
App., 1897).
88 Hall v. Pratt, 29 S. E. 764 (Ga., 1898); Williams v. Merchants Bank,
4 S. W. 163 (Texas, 1887); Bank of Commerce v. Fuqua, 28 P. 291 (Mont., 1891).
89 Adams v. Addington, 16 Fed. 89 (C. C., 1882); Hubbard v. Harrison, 38
Ind. 323 (1871); Smith v. Muncie Nat. Bank, 29 Ind. 158 (1867).
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In Indiana the courts have stated that the liability for
such fees attaches to all parties to the paper if the states in
which the instruments were executed recognize the stipula-
tion as valid.9 0
When the parties to a note agree that in case suit is
brought to enforce payment thereof, they will pay a reason-
able attorney's fee, the indorser is liable for the fee incurred
by the indorsee in the suit against himself but not for that
incurred in a prior unsuccessful suit against the maker.91
An accommodation indorser who took up the note on dis-
honor at maturity without paying any attorney's fees and
who brought suit against the maker may recover a reasonable
attorney's fee actually incurred by him but not exceeding the
percentage named in the note.92
'The question also often occurs in decedent's estates; in an
action against a decedent's estate upon a note given by the
decedent and stipulating for attorney's fees such fees may
be recovered against the estate if the claim is filed after ma-
turity,"3 for if the decedent were living and suit were brought
against him, there could be no doubt about the plaintiff's
right to recover such fees as had necessarily been incurred
in the collection of the note and there is no reason why they
may not be collected from his estate.94 As a rule, any obliga-
tion that can be enforced against a person while living may
be enforced against such person's estate, and a stipulation
to pay attorney's fees is within the rule.9"
A note, providing for attorney's fees, filed before maturity
as a claim in an estate and properly allowed by the adminis-
trators gives no right for attorney's fees;" 6 in such cases
90 Smith v. Muncie Bank, 29 Ind. 158 (1867); Hubbard v. Harrison, 38 Ind.
323 (1871).
91 Highleyman v. McDowell Motor Co., 202 Mo. App. 221, 216 S. W. 52
(1919).
92 Cox v. Hagan, 125 Va. 656, 100 S. E. 666. (1919).
98 Bond v. Omdorff, 77 Ind. 583 (1881).
94 Bond v. Omdorff, 77 Ind. 583 (1881).
95 Bond v. Omdorff, 77 Ind. 583 (1881).
96 Bond v. Omdorff, 77 Ind. 583 (1881); See also St. Joseph's County Savings
Bank v. Randall Administrators, 37 Ind. App. 402, 76 N. E. 1012 (1905).
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there is no pretense of any breach on the part of the maker
of the notes of any of the stipulations therein contained, and
without a breach the expenditure for attorney's fees is not
on account of any fault of the maker or his representative,
and not therefore chargeable to his estate. The cost of pre-
paring and presenting the claim of the plaintiff to the clerk
is a matter for the claimant, and any expenditure made by
him in the way of attorney's fees is not covered by the
clause, "and attorney's fees," in the note.97
Where a promissory note stipulating for the payment of
attorney's fees is filed against a decedent's estate, the claim-
ant is entitled to introduce evidence of the value of the at-
torney's fees, without any formal demand in such claim for
judgment for no formal pleading is necessary in such a case.98
However, the claim for attorney's fees must be duly filed
and notice of claim must be served as prescribed by statute
if a jurisdiction has a statute prescribing such.99 In bank-
ruptcy matters, in many cases the notes, by which a bank-
rupt's indebtedness is evidence, contain a provision for an
attorney's fee for the collection therefor. In such cases, if
the claim has been placed with an attorney for collection
prior to bankruptcy, and collection proceedings have been
actually instituted, so that the attorney's fee has a fixed
liability at the time of filing of petition in bankruptcy, such
fee will constitute a provable debt against the estate of the
debtor.1"' Where the obligation has not been given to an at-
torney to collect, or no effort has been made to realize there-
on such as would authorize collection of the fee as part of
the claim, the stipulated fee, in such cases, has not become
such a fixed liability as to make it available as a provable
debt in bankruptcy.' However, under the laws of Texas, 02
97 St. Joseph County Sav. Bk. v. Randall, 37 Ind. App. 402, 76 N. E. 1012
(1905).
98 Hanna, Executor v. Fisher, 95 Ind. 383 (1883).
99 Penick Supply Co. v. Anderson, 23 Ga. App. 244, 97 S. E. 889 (1919).
100 In re Ledbetter, 267 F. 893 (D. C. Ga., 1920).
101 In re Griffin Drug Co., 289 F. 140 (1923); Merchants' Bank v. Thomas,
121 F. 306, 57 C. C. A. 374 (Miss., 1903).
102 In re Roche, 101 F. 966, 42 C. C. A. 115 (Texas, 1900); In re Gimbel,
294 F. 883, Am. Bankr. Rep. (N. S.) 295 (C. C. A. Texas, 1923).
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by which the attorney's fees, when due under the terms of
the contract, become a part of the contract debt, where notes
of a bankrupt provide for attorney's fees in case the notes
were placed in the hands of attorney for collection, and they
were so placed before the filing of a petition, the stipulated
fees are allowable as part of the debt on the notes, though
attorneys took no action until after the filing of the peti-
tion.103
A debtor's insolvency does not prohibit the rendering of
judgment for attorney's fees where the note provides for
such fees."0 "
PREASONABLENESS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Another matter often to be determined concerns the rea-
sonableness of the attorney's fees; the problem of deter-
mining what amounts to a reasonable fee is usually one for
the jury when the evidence presented is conflicting;'0° the
court can, however, reduce the amount awarded if exces-
sive,"' or grant a new trial,107 or increase the amount, if
inadequate,0 8 and where the judgment on a note includes
excessive amounts for attorney's fee the court may reverse
the trial court.109
In deciding whether certain sums are inadequate, unrea-
sonable, or excessive the question of what elements should
be taken into consideration in determining a reasonable fee
103 McCabe v. Patton, 174 F. 217, 23 Am. Bankr. Rep. 335 (C. C. A. Pa.,
1909); In re Haynsworth, 34 F. 2d 334, affirmed in part and reversed in part;
Jones v. Kendall, 34 F. 2d 344 (1928).
104 Security Mortgage Co. v. Powers, 49 S. Ct. 84, 278 U. S. 149, 73 L. ed.
236 (1928).
105 Beck v. O'Dell, 193 Ind. 386, 140 N. E. 527 (1923); McCreary v. Stevens,
156 Miss. 330, 126 So. 4 (1930); Hillside State Bank v. Christensen, 229 P. 105
(1914); Roderer v. Schmitt, 258 Ky. 398, 80 S. W. 2d 35 (1935); Maxwell v.
Yancy, 167 Okla. 158, 28 P. 2d 989, 6 Chi. L. Rev. 484 (1934); Contra: The rea-
sonableness of attorney's fees is for the court and not the jury. Read Phosphate
Co. v. Jenkins, 120 S. C. 337, 113 S. E. 317 (1922); Bank of Enoree v. Yarbor-
ough, 120 S. C. 385, 113 S. E. 313 (1922).
106 McCluskey v. Kalben, 167 Md. 479, 175 A. 449 (1934).
107 Leonard . Rosendabl, 133 Minn. 329, 158 N. W. 419 (1916).
108 Daly v. Power, 236 Ky. 426, 33 S. W. 2d 305 (1930).
109 Nesbitt v. Nesbitt, 43 .nd. App. 47 (1908).
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arises. While the courts take note of the time spent,"' the
fee will not be larger because a certain length of time was
taken where a diligent lawyer could have performed the
services in a much shorter period."' Closely associated with
both time and attorney's skill is his experience. One court
has said, "there seems to be apparent a notion that any
young gentleman two or three years out of law school has a
right to charge at the rate of fifty dollars a day for his serv-
ices because men of age, experienced, and established repu-
tation and capacity to perform much legal work any day,
sometimes, or ordinarily, receive that much. This is not cor-
rect." 112
The amount involved is a factor invariably present in a
discussion of reasonable fees;" 3 this is to be expected since
the amount involved is large, more is at stake, the attorney's
concern is greater and more work is done on the case, hence
a more substantial fee. The responsibility of the attorney is
important in determining his reasonable fee. Responsibility
refers to the share of the litigation handled by the attor-
ney,"' i. e., whether he was the sole counsel or worked with
others; and to anxiety, such as would be created by the
knowledge that the physical well-being of the client de-
pended upon the outcome of the case," 5 and the result of
the litigation is an important factor." 6 The law recognizes
that the results accomplished by an attorney for his client
constitute a material element in the value of the legal serv-
ices," 7 also considerable regard is given to the customary
fee;"' as to the admission of evidence to reveal the client's
110 Nelson v. Auch, 62 N. D. 594, 245 N. W. 819 (1932).
111 Irwin v. Swinney, 45 F. 2d 890 (1930).
112 Syzmanski v. Syzmanski, 151 Wis. 145, 138 N. W. 53 (1912).
11s Smith v. Chicago I. N. W. R. Co., 60 Iowa 515, 15 N. W. 291 (1883);
For a discussion of what constitutes reasonable attorney's fee in the absence of a
provision in contract or statute fixing the amount see note 9 A. L. R. 237.
114 Glidden v. Cowen, 123 F. 48 (C. C. A. 6th, Eastern Dist. of Ky., 1903).
115 Succession v. Pons, 142 La. 721, 77 So. 515 (1918).
116 Randall v. Packard, 142 N. Y. 47, 36 N. E. 823 (1894).
117 McDougal v. Black Panther Oil & Gas Co., 277 F. 701 (C. C. A. 8th,
1921).
118 Kline v. Blackwell, 63 F. 2d 897 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933).
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financial status a division of opinion exists. Some courts al-
low such evidence," 9 others refuse it; 2 whenever such evi-
dence is admitted, it is not for the purpose of enhancing the
compensation beyond a reasonable amount but to ascertain
the ability of the client to pay even that sum;'' thus where
the client cannot earn more than ordinary wages the charge
should be small as compared to the usual fee.' 2
No one of the elements which go to make up a reasonable
fee is controlling. All of these factors are to be regarded and
each is given such weight as the trier of the fact thinks ap-
propriate in the case under consideration. 3
Where a stipulation for a specified fee was held valid, it
was further held that unreasonableness was a matter of af-
firmative defense and, in the absence of proof, the holder
was prima facie entitled to recover the stipulated sum, or
that the amount stipulated in the note was reasonable. 24
EFFECT OF TENDER OF PAYMENT.
When tender of payment is made it has its effect; thus
the tender of payment of notes on or at any time after ma-
turity and before they are placed in the hands of an attorney
for collection relieves the maker of liability for attorney's
fees;' 25 but the tender of the amount due on the promissory
note must include attorney's fees, when the note calls for
such fees, and the note is in the hands of an attorney for col-
lection, and there is a dispute about the amount due;26
where a tender is sought to be made by the maker of the
119 Walker v. Hill, 90 Mont. 111, 300 P. 260 (1931).
.120 Nelson v. Auch, 62 N. D. 594, 245 N. W. 819 (1932).
121 Ward v. Cohni58 F. 462 (C. C. A. 8th, 1893).
122 People v. Plo, 308 I1.. 128, 139 N. E. 45 (1923).
123 Platt v. Shields, 96 Vt. 257, 119 A. 520 (1923); Schlesinger v. Dunne, 73
N. Y. Supp. 1014, 36 Misce Rep. 529 (1901); Kirchoff v. Bernstein, 92 Ore. 378,
181 P. 746 (1919).
124 Smiley v. Meir, 47 Ind. 559 (1874); Utah Nat. Bank v. Nelson, 38 Utah
169, 111 P. 907 (1910).
-125 Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Duvall, 129 S. W. 2d 770 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1939); Urbish v. Rutledge, 299 S. W. 921 (Tex. Civ. App., 1927).
126 Rouyer v. Miller, 16 Ind. App. 519,44 N. E. 51 (1896).
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note of the full amount thereof, and should the holder of
such note refuse to give information concerning the attor-
ney's fees when called for, or should the debtor be ignorant
of the employment of the attorney, or the tender be refused
upon other grounds, and he be thereby misled, the court
would doubtlessly protect the debtor in the making of such
a tender.'27 For example, where a money lender loans money
and takes a note for the amount and a deed of the land as
security and the debtor after the note became due and be-
fore the holder had placed it in the hands of an attorney in-
formed the creditor that he was willing then to pay the
amount due, and the creditor refused to reconvey except up-
on an excessive payment by the debtor and the debtor
brought suit to redeem and cause a reconveyance, the cred-
itor was not entitled to an attorney's fee upon the note-'2 s
Where no actual tender of the amount due on the note is
made, the maker's request that the collateral be delivered
to him for collection so he can pay the note is not a tender,
so as to relieve him of the attorney's fee.'29
PLEADINGS, EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS.
An investigation of the law as to the pleadings, evidence
and findings in suits upon instruments containing provisions
for attorney's fees is essential to a comprehensive considera-
tion of this subject. We find that in an action on a note pro-
viding for attorney fees, such fees cannot be assessed where
there is no allegation in the complaint relative to such fees.1 0
The desirable procedure, when no particular per cent is stip-
ulated in the note, is for the plaintiff to plead the amount
claimed to be a reasonable fee and to offer proof in support
thereof. 1'
127 Rouyer v. Miller, 16 Ind. App. 519, 44 N. E. 51 (1896).
128 Lewis v. Lee, 75 Ind. App. 263, 130 N. E. 443 (1921).
129 Rainey v. Jackson, 126 Cal. App. 723, 14 P. 2d 1025 (1932).
130 Stout v. Gaar, Scott & Co., 26 Ind. App. 582, 60 N. E. 357 (1901).
131 Staheli v. Adams, 56 Utah 276, 190 P. 781 (1920); Lindley v. Sullivan,
133 Ind. 588, 32 N. E. 738 (1893); Glenn v. Porter, 22 Ind. 525 (1864); Statnes
v. Schofield, 5 Ind. App. 4, 31 N. E. 480 (1892).
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In Indiana, while good pleading requires that in an action
on a note providing for attorney's fees the value of the serv-
ices should be stated, yet under the general claim for dam-
ages, evidence may be admitted without such averment as
to the value of the services, and a recovery may be had for
such fee, provided, however, the whole recovery does not
exceed the amount for which judgment is demanded in the
complaint,"3 2 and where suit was brought upon a promissory
note, which contained an agreement to pay a reasonable fee
for the plaintiff's attorney if the note should be collected by
suit, it was held not to be a sufficient cause for reversing a
judgment which included an allowance for such fee, even
when the complaint did not state the amount of the fee
claimed. 8 '
In some jurisdictions, under what is considered the better
practice, no recovery can be had on such stipulation for at-
torney's fees unless it is specially declared upon;' 34 in other
jurisdictions it is provided that attorney'9 fees shall not be
taxed as part of the costs in a suit upon a note unless an affi-
davit as required by statute is made.3 5 In a Georgia case a
judgment for attorney's fees was held erroneous, where there
was a failure to show the amount that the plaintiff agreed to
pay his attorney for services in the suit. In that jurisdiction,
before attorney's fees can be recovered on a note executed
since the passage of the act of 1900, it must be alleged in
the pleading that the required statutory notice has been giv-
en, and if such allegation is denied, it must be proved at the
trial.3 6 In some states the plaintiff must allege and estab-
lish that he has paid or incurred a valid liability for the serv-
132 Lindley v. Sullivan, 133 Ind. 588, 32 N. E. 738 (1893); Starnes v. Scho-
field, 5 Ind. App. 4, 31 N. E. 480 (1892).
133 Roberts v. Comer, 41 Ind. 475 (1872); Glenn v. Porter, 72 Ind. 325
(1880); Price v. Jones, 105 Ind. 543, 5 N. E. 683, 55 Am. Rep. 230 (1886).
134 Nickerson v. Sheldon, 33 Ill. 372; Miller v. Ambassador Park Syndicate,
121 Cal. App. 92, 9 P. 2d 267 (1932).
135 North v. vlas, 114 Fla. 560, 154 So. 245 (1934).
1351 Van Epps' Code, Supp., § 6185.
136 Pritchard v. McCary, 122 Ga. 606, 50 S. E. 366 (1905).
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ices of an attorney when the note provides that an attorney
must be employed.13 7 So where a note provided for attor-
ney's fees if it should be placed in the hands of an attorney
for collection, no recovery for attorney's fees could be had
in an action thereon in absence of an allegation in the peti-
tion that the note had been placed in the hands of an attor-
ney.'38 But if the note provides for attorney's fees in case of
suit, plaintiff to recover such fees need not allege the self-
evident fact of the bringing of the suit.3 9
Strictly, there should be an averment in the complaint of
the amount claimed and reasonably due for attorney's fees,
yet where a complaint on a promissory note does not contain
an averment of an amount claimed and reasonably due as
attorney's fees, where the note filed with the complaint
stipulates for the payment of attorney's fees, the judgment
taken by default will not be reviewed because it allows an
amount for attorney's fees, provided the sum for which judg-
ment is demanded is large enough to cover the judgment ren-
dered. 40
In some states, however, the plaintiff suing on a note must
pray for interest or attorney's fees in order to recover
them.'4'
Some matters as to evidence are pertinent to this discus-
sion. Thus where a promissory note contains an agreement
to pay attorney fees, such agreement should be alleged in
the same paragraph of complaint that asks a recovery on the
note, and evidence is admissible in support of such aver-
ment, 4" and the burden is upon plaintiff to show the amount
of his attorney fees.'43
137 Dickenson v. First Nat. Bank, 132 So. 835 (Fla., 1931); Porter v.
Monarch, 17 Idaho 364, 106 P. 299 (1910); Koppe v. Groginsky, 132 S. W. 984
(Tex., 1910); Fowler v. Industrial Acceptance Corp., 101 Fla. 259, 134 So. 60
(1931).
138 Le Tulle Mercantile Co. v. Rugeley, 98 S. W. 438 (Tex., 1906).
139 Adams v. Bartell, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 349, 102 S. W. 779 (1907).
140 Moore, Admx. v. Staser, 6 Ind. App. 364, 32 N. E. 563, 33 N. E. 665
(1892).
'41 Sandifer v. Stephens, 8 La. App. 946 (1928).
142 Mathews v. Norman, 42 Ind. 176 (1873).
143 Shoup v. Snepp, 22 Ind. App. 30, 53 N. E. 189 (1899).
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The rule is well established that unless evidence is heard
which fairly tends to prove how much is due, it is error to
add a sum for attorney's fees to the amount otherwise due
on a promissory note which merely provides for "attorney's
fees," without indicating the amount, in the absence of a
stipulation by the parties covering the same. The court will
not take judicial notice of what constitutes a reasonable
fee.
1 44
It has been repeatedly held in Indiana that where the
amount of attorney's fees is not fixed in the note, the amount
thereof must be established by proper evidence. In the case
of Interstate Motor Freight System v. Gasoline Equipment
Co. Inc.,'4 the only evidence as to the value of attorney's fees
which appeared in the record is the testimony of H. Nathan
Swaim, who testified that he was a practicing attorney in
Indianapolis and familiar with the fees charged by attorneys
generally in actions for the collection of notes. A hypothetical
question was then asked Mr. Swaim in which there was de-
tailed various steps Which the attorneys had followed in the
preparation of the pleading and trial of the case. The witness
testified basing his opinion upon the facts recited that the
value of such services was $350. This evidence was held to
justify the $300 attorney's fees.
But the rule as to evidence is reversed where the note fixes
the amount of attorney's fee at a specific per cent, so if a
note made a part of a complaint fixes the amount of attor-
ney's fees at ten per cent it is the same as if the complaint al-
leged that a reasonable fee would be ten per cent on the
amount due, and no evidence other than the note is neces-
144 Getman v. Hayhow, 103 Okla. 161, 229 P. 559 (1924); Atkinson v. Neb-
lett, 144 Va. 220, 132 S. E. 326 (1926); See also Winslow Gas Co. v. Plost, 69
Ind. App. 611, 122 N. E. 594 (1919) ; Contra: Burtt v. Schoening,. 138 Wash. 187,
244 P. 381 (1926); Kindel v. French, 190 Ind. 595, 131 N. E. 227 (1921); Prescott
v. Grady, 91 Cal. 521, 27 P. 755 (1891); Stames v. Schofild, 5 Ind. App. 4
(1891); Bowser v. Palmer, 33 Ind. 124 (1870); Wyant v. Pottorff, 37 Ind. 512
(1871); Fowler v. Industrial Acceptance Corp., 101 Fla. 259, 134 So.; 60 (1931);
Wiley v. Starbuck, 44 Ind. 298 (1873).
145 Interstate Motor Freight System v. Gasoline Equipment Co., 24 N. E.
2d 418 (ind. App., 1940).
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sary;'". and pleadings involved, when properly identified,
may be put in evidence to corroborate the testimony of the
plaintiff.'47
The fact that the judgment for attorney fees is in excess
of the fees alleged in the complaint is no ground for a reversal
if it is within the total amount demanded in the complaint
and the evidence is undisputed. 4 '
In one jurisdiction it has been decided that when a note
provided for a stipulated attorney's fee, the burden is on the
defendant to show the fee was excessive. 49
There are numerous cases which pass upon the amount of
recovery. Thus it has been decided that a stipulation in a
note to pay attorney's fees is in the nature of an indemnity
contract and as a general rule the holder can recover there-
under only such sums as he has actually and necessarily ex-
pended or become liable for on account of the default of the
maker and then only when they are reasonable;... a holder
may recover on the note only such amount for attorneys
fees as his attorney could recover from him for his services,
that is, the reasonable value of his services should be the
measure of the recovery;. 5' and where the admitted facts
show that a client received the sum of $300 for attorney's
146 Smiley v. Meir, 47 Ind. 559 (1874).
147 State Exchange Bank v. Paul, 58 Ind. App. 487, 108 N. E. 532 (1915).
148 Amott v. McClintock-Tumkey Co., 75 Ind. App. 308, 130 N. E. 436
(1921); Lindley v. Sullivan, 133 Ind. 588, 32 N. E. 738 (1893); Wyant v. Pattorff,
37 Ind. 512 (1871).
149 Osage Oil & Ref. Co. v. Dickason-Goodman Lumber Co., 106 Okla. 119,
231 P. 465 (1924).
150 Goss v. Bowen, 104 Ind. 207, 2 N. E. 704 (1885); Stamnes v. Schofield,
5 Ind. App. 4, 31 N. E. 480 (1892); Moore v. Staser, 6 Ind. App. 364, 32 N. E.
563 (1893); Judson v. Romaine, 8 Ind. App. 390, 35 N. E. 812 (1893); Farmers
etc. Nat. Bank v. Banton, 21 Ill. App. 403; Winslow Gas. Co. v. Plast, 69 Ind. App.
611, 122 N. E. 594 (1919); St. Joseph County Say. Bk. v. Randall, 37 Ind. App.
402, 76 N. E. 1012 (1906); French v. Cunningham, 149 Ind. 632, 49 N. E. 797
(1898) ; Hamilton v. Burgess, 170 So. 233, 348 Ala. 4, reversing; 27 Ala. 272, 170
So. 346 (1936); Rogers v. Kemp Lbr. Co., 137 P. 586 (1907); Rouyer v. Miller,
16 Ind. App. 519, 44 N. E. 51, 45 N. E. 674 (1896).
151 Texas Land & Loan Co. v. Roberston, 38 Tex. Civ. App. 521, 85 S. W.
1020 (1905).
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fees, the attorney was entitled to collect the entire $300 from
his client for his fees. 52
In the absence of a contract, express or implied, between
attorney and client, the attorney is only entitled to recover
from his client the reasonable value of his services; 1" in
an action on a note containing an unconditional promise to
pay attorney's fees, where defendant offered to prove in mit-
igation of damages that the attorney employed by the plain-
tiff had agreed to receive one-fourth of the attorney's fees, it
was error to reject such offered evidence, as the holder of a
note can recover only what he agrees to pay his attorneys; 54
as to the employment of an attorney it can be said that when
a note is sued on and the pleadings are signed by an attor-
ney, a presumption obtains that he has been employed to
bring suit,'55 for a holder is entitled to recover attorney's fee
if after default by the maker of the note it is placed with an
attorney for collection, whether suit is brought or not;...
but where the maker offered to pay the notes in full before
the payee employed an attorney to make collection the payee
cannot thereafter collect attorney fees.' 57
The reasonable attorney's fees under the contract of the
maker and indorser of a note to pay such fees, if recoverable
at all, are recoverable as part of the contractual obligation
and not as part of the costs; 5 but where a note does not
provide for attorney's fees, taxation of attorney's fees as part
of the costs is erroneous. 159
The amount of attorney's fees fixed in a note is prima
facie the sum recoverable, subject to be reduced by proof
152 Thayer v. Harbican, 70 Wash. 278, 126 P. 625 (1912).
153 W. E. Rogers v. Kemp Lumber Company, 137 P. 586 (N. M., 1913).
154 Harvey v. Baldwin, 124 Ind. 59, 26 N. E. 222 (1891).
155 Rychener v. McGuire, 66 S. W. 2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App., 1933).
156 Nett v. Stockgrowers Finance Corp., 84 Mont. 116, 274 P. 497 (1929);
Moore v. Staser, 6 Ind. App. 364, 32 N. E. 563, 33 N. E. 665 (1893); Explained
in Shoup v. Snepp, 22 Ind. App. 30, 53 N. E. 189 (1899).
157 Donohoe v. Perker, 18 S. W. 2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App., 1929).
158 Schillinger v. Leary, 201 Ala. 256, 77 So. 846 (1917).
159 Koontz v. Clark Bros., 209 Iowa 62, 227 N. W. 584 (1929); Rutland Say.
Bank v. Ferguson, 92 S. W. 2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App., 1936).
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that such sum is unreasonable and excessive, or that the
plaintiff has not incurred a liability to pay the full amount.16 °
In New York a stipulation for fifteen per cent attorney's
fees is valid;' 6 ' however, in Texas it is stated that if the
owner of the note in good faith agrees with an attorney to
pay him the percentage stated in the stipulation for attor-
ney's fees in a note, that amount is recoverable whether it is
a reasonable fee or not.
162
In some jurisdictions, where the judgment for attorney's
fees corresponds with the undisputed evidence as to the
value of such fees, a new trial will not be awarded on the
ground that the amount of recovery is greater than the
value of such fees, as alleged in the complaint. Under such
circumstances the complaint, after verdict, will be deemed
to have been amended to correspond with the evidence.168
Allowance of less than the amount of attorney's fees stipu-
lated in the note has been held not to be error; ' if the
amount is left blank in the note it must be understood that
the maker agreed to pay a reasonable amount.'65
In the event there is a set-off or counterclaim the prevail-
ing view is that the amount of attorney's fees recoverable,
160 L. R. A. 1915-B, 928, 930; McCornick v. Swem, 36 Utah .6, 102 P. 626
(1909); Smiley v. Meir, 47 Ind. 559 (1874); Conway v. Am. Nat. Bank of Dan-
ville, 146 Va. 357, 131 S. E. 803 (1926); Taylor v. Continental Supply Co., 16 F.
2d 578 (1926); Sedgwick on Damages, 9th Ed., Sec. 695c; Stephenson v. Allison,
123 Ala. 439, 26 So. 290 (1889); Stames v. Schofield, 5 Ind. App. 519, 44 N. E.
51, 45 N. E. 674 (1896); Also, see cases holding contra, that the plaintiff must
prove the reasonable fee and can recover only that; Campbell v. Worman, 58
Minn. 561, 60 N. W. 668 (1894).
161 Commercial Invest. Trust Ind. v. Eskew, 212 N. Y. 5718, 126 Misc. 114
(1925).
162 Frantz. v. Masterson, 133 S. W. 740 (Tex. Civ. App., 1911).
168 McKernan, Admr. v. Estabrook, 75 Ind. App. 309, 130 N. E. 436 (1920);
Arnott v. McClintock Turnkey Co., 75 Ind. App. 308, 130 N. E. 436 (1921).
164 Richardson v. Breeding, 167 Va. 30, 187 S. E. 454 (1936); Sewell v. Wil-
cox, 290 S. W. 264 (1926).
165 Hawley v. Isaacson, 117 Wash. 197, 200 P. 1 109 (1921); McCornick v.
Swem, 36 Utah 6, 102 P. 626 (1909); Strough v. Gear, 48 Ind. 100 (1874); Con-
tra: "Where the space left for the amount of an attorney's fee was left blank by
drawing the pen across the blank, it was the intention of the parties to provide for
no attorney's fees."; Scandinavian Am. Bank v. Long, 75 Wash. 270, t34 P. 913
(1913).
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if on a percentage basis, is calculated on the net amount of
the judgment after subtracting set-offs and counterclaims;166
the principle, however, does not permit a reduction of the
amount due on a note arising from independent counter-
claims. In one case "' involving the provision in a promis-
sory note the court stated that the plaintiff was entitled to
an attorney's fee of fifteen percent of the net amount of the
judgment, after deduction of the counterclaim. This case
follows the prevailing rule throughout the United States.168
It is clear that the above rule should not apply where coun-
terclaims are unconnected with the instrument for such
cannot logically be held to reduce the amount owed on the
note, and hence the attorney's fee should be reckoned on the
principal found due, without any deductions for independent
counterclaims. The attorney's claim is not grounded upon
the enrichment of his client, as in the case of a contingent
fee, but is based on the promise of the maker of the note to
pay a stated percentage of the due and unpaid principal as
an indemnity to the holder for the expense caused the latter
by the maker's failure to pay the note when duly presented.
In the contingent fee case, any set-off, related- or unrelated
to the subject-matter.of the action, diminishes the amount
recovered by the attorney and consequently the fund in
which the attorney is entitled to share. Siniilarly, in the
note cases, set-offs which are directly concerned with the
transaction in which the note was given may reduce the sum
on which the attorney's percentage is reckoned. But set-offs,
arising from claims unconnected with the giving of the note
cannot logically be held to reduce the amount owed on the
note, and hence the attorney's fee should be reckoned on the
principal found due, without any deductions from either in-
dependent counterclaims or set-offs.
166 Slack v. Elkins, 10 Ga. App. 571, 73 S. E. 862 (1912); Walker v. Tom-
linson, 44 Tex. Civ. App. 446, 98 S. W. 906 (1906).
167 21 Cal. L. Rev. 275; Bongiovanni v. Fickett, 69 Cal. App. Dec. 305,
10 P. 2d 539 (1932).
168 Morgan v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 213 Ala. 551, 106 So. 136 (1925);
Ward v. Boydston, 63 Tex. Civ. App. 656, 134 S. W. 768 (1911).
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In our search of the decisions and statutes, we found only
one state, Georgia, requiring written notice to be given the
defendant of the intention to sue for attorney's fees along
with the note. And in Georgia the rule is that attorney's fees
on note cannot be recovered unless written notice is given
ten days before suit of intention and court term, 6 ' and un-
less such notice is given, no attorney's fees can be collected
even though the note states otherwise upon its face, 7 ° and
this notice, requisite to recovery of attorney's fees in suit on
note, cannot be waived.
171
If a jury does not return a verdict for attorney's fees, the
court may add the stipulated or reasonable fee in rendering
the judgment.
7 2
But if a note sued on does not provide for attorney's fees,
taxation of attorney's fees as part of costs is erroneous."'
If the amount awarded by the jury as attorney's fees is
excessive under a note providing for attorney's fees, it may
be reduced; but if the amount awarded is so small that jus-
tice has not been done, the court may grant a new trial.
174
It has been held that where a note stipulates for a specified
percentage for attorney's fees and is prayed for, the supreme
court is justified in allowing said attorney's fees if both jury
and trial court fail to allow it.'
Some questions have arisen as to whether the recovery
of attorney's fees must be in one cause of action with the
note. The general rule is that if the plaintiff secures a judg-
ment on the note without also having proceeded in the same
169 Walton v. Hines, 40 Ga. App. 757, 151 S. E. 558 (1930).
170 Oliver v. Lane, 46 Ga. App. 136, 167 S. E. 116 (1932).
171 Miller v. Jackson, 49 Ga. App. 322, 175 S. E. 409 (1934).
172 Fuloransky v. Pope, 57 Okla. 755, 157 P. 905 (1915); Continental Gin
Co. v. Sullivan, 48 Okla. 332, 150 P. 209 (1915); (Mandatory upon trial court and
if it does not add fees, the Supreme Court may do so.); Pivot City Realty Co. v.
State Say. & Trust Co., 88 Ind. App. 222, 162 N. E. 27 (1928).
173 Koontz v. Clark Bros., 209 Iowa 62, 227 N. W. 584 (1929); Schaefer v.
Brown, 151 So. 650 (La. App., 1933).
174 Hillsdale State Bank v. Christensen, 32 Wyo. 68, 229 P. 105 (1914).
175 Cunningham v. Spencer, 111 Okla. 217, 239 P. 444 (1925).
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action for the costs of collection and attorney's fees, he can-
not recover them in another action, since the contract has
become merged in the judgment; 1 6 the wording of the pro-
vision, however, has led to a contrary holding, as when a note
provided for an attorney's fee, "if it was collected by suit,"
it was held the fee did not become due until after the insti-
tution of suit, so that it could not be included in the judg-
ment but must be recovered in a separate action. 7 It was
also held in First State Bank v. Cokasset Wooden Ware
Co.,177 that a general denial does not put in issue the reason-
able value of attorney's fees stipulated for in the note, since
the claim is not a part of the cause of action on the note, the
attorney's fees do not accrue until the services are performed
and then their value may be determined by the court on ap-
plication. In Illinois, recovery cannot be had in the same
action." 8
The Indiana Supreme Court, recognizing both rules,
stated: 79 "The attorney's fee is incident to the main debt or
contract, and as we have held, cannot be sued for in a sepa-
rate action, after judgment has been taken on the note for
the amount of the debt. Such fees may be included in the
judgment, with the principal and interest of the note. While
we fully recognize the correctness of the general rule con-
tended for by the learned counsel, that an action cannot be
maintained on a cause of action which had not matured when
suit was instituted, we do not see that economy, convenience,
or justice would be promoted by applying the rule contend-
ed for by counsel, in preference to that which allows the
whole cause of action embraced in the note, including the at-
torney's fee, to be included in one judgment." This decision
ignores legal logic but seems to arrive at a practical and just
decision. 8 °
176 Sands v. Roller, 118 Va. 191, 86 S. E. 857 (1919); The First Nat. Bank
of Ind'pls v. The Ind'pls Piano Mfg. Co., 45 Ind. 5 (1873).
177 Anderson v. Terhune, 206 111. App. 348.
177G 136 Minn. 103, 161 N. W. 398.
178 Dearlove v. Edwards, 166 11. 619,46 N. E. 1081 (1897).
179 Smiley v. Meir, 47 Ind. 559 (1874).
180 Smiley v. Meir, 47 Ind. 559 (1874).
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But when the recovery is not upon the note, but upon the
original obligation, attorney's fees stipulated in note are
not allowed."8 ' The reason for this rule is that in the original
obligation there was no promise to pay attorney's fees; con-
sequently, a suit on the original obligation should result only
in judgment for the amount of the original obligation.
An executory agreement by the superintendent of banks,
waiving stipulation for attorney's fees, not supported by
consideration or involving estoppel, has been held unin-
forceable.'" 2
Attorney's fees will not draw interest pending an appeal
or other legal delay before payment.18 The Supreme Court
of Washington has decided that attorney's fees are not col-
lectible except in case of default in payment of the principal
debt, and that a suit to collect an installment of interest due
does not warrant an allowance of a fee to the attorney for
the plaintiff. 8 '
The question has been litigated as to such a provision in
school, rent, township and a variety of such notes; thus a
stipulation to pay attorney's fees in case of suit on a school
note is not a provision for a penalty, but one of indemnity
against reasonable expenditure, which is necessarily includ-
ed in the power granted to county boards of public instruc-
tion to borrow money. 8 '
Where a tenant gives a rent note containing an agreement
to pay an attorney's fee, and an attachment for rent is sued
out, followed by replevin and trial in accirdance with statu-
tory proceedings, an attorney's fee cannot be allowed to the
landlord; the lien statute not including an attorney's fee. 86
181 Park v. Newell, 87 Wash. 431, 151 P. 783 (1915).
182 Ross and Williams v. Southern Exchange Bank of Dublin, 38 Ga. App.
532, 144 S. E. 338 (1928).
183 Star Wagon Co. v. Swezy, 63 Ia. 520, 19 N. W. 298 (1884).
184 Merrill v. Muzzy, 11 Wash. 16, 39 P. 279 (1895).
185 First Nat. Bank v. Bd. of Public Instruction for Jackson County, 114
Fla. 571, 154 So. 314 (1934).
188 O'Keefe v. McLemore, 125 Miss. 394, 87 So. 655 (1921).
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Another view taken is that a school township cannot be
held liable upon an attorney fee clause in a note. The powers
of trustee to make contracts being limited to those granted
by statute."8 7 The matter of attorney's fees frequently arises
in determining court costs. Some courts hold that as the law
awards to a successful party only his taxable costs, and fees
which he pays to attorneys are not taken into consideration
and can only be recovered when there is some written agree-
ment between the parties for the payment of the same or it
is provided so by statute.' 8 One court states, however, that
the attorney's fees are not costs or in the nature of costs.
They form a part of the cause of action. They are recovered
because they are provided for in the contract sued upon."8 9
An Oklahoma court, however, has said that it is better prac-
tice to include such fee in the judgment proper, than to tax
it as part of the cost, 90 leaving an inference that attorney's
fees might be taxed as part of the costs. This case, however,
does not follow the weight of authority.
In Pennsylvania it is provided that attorney's fees cannot
be taxed in more than one suit on the same instrument.1 '
Some courts hold that a stipulation for attorney's fees is
one for liquidated damages and such fees are recoverable in
an action on the note without proof that they were in-
curred. 9 ' However, as we have seen heretofore the weight
of authority is contra.
As to an acceleration clause and attorney fee provision,
where it is provided that, if any one of a series of notes is in
default, the entire series of notes shall become due, and the
notes, the maturity of which has been accelerated by the de-
187 Snoddy v. Wabash School Township of Fountain County, 17 Ind. App.
284 (1896).
188 Wade v. Whitsil, 9 Tenn. App. 436.
189 Groves v. Wiles, 1 Ind. App. 174, 27 N. E. 309 (1891).
190 Kerr v. McKinney, 69 Okla. 88, 170 P. 685 (1918).
191 Purd. Dig., p. 188, Sec. 9; p. 1371, Sec. 9.
192 W. K. Henderson Iron Works & Supply Co. v. Meriwether Supply Co.,
178 La. 516, 152 So. 69 (1934); Roller v. Hamilton, 13 Tenn. App. 241.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
fault, provide for ten percent attorney's fees, the same may
be collected as provided by law.'93
Another question which arises is in cases where the
amount determines the jurisdiction. The general rule is that
attorney's fees, expressly contracted for in a note and sought
to be recovered in a suit, are a part of the contract and must
be considered in estimating the amount in controversy in
determining the jurisdiction of a justice court.
The general rule is that attorney's fees, expressly con-
tracted for in a note and sought to be recovered in a suit, are
a part of the contract and must be considered in estimating
the amount in controversy in determining the jurisdiction of
a justice court;' 94 so where the jurisdiction of a court de-
pends on the amount involved, the attorney's fee promised in
the note and sued for and demanded in the declaration are to
be included in determining said amount.'95
WHEN FEES DUE.
When the fee becomes due is often important, thus where
an action is commenced before the time fixed for settlement,
no attorney's fees can be recovered for the reason that a
contract to recover attorney's fees is a contract of indemnity
which is only effective in case of a breach on the part of the
maker.19
Reasoning from the majority rule heretofore set out that
a note containing a provision for attorney's fees is negotiable,
valid and enforceable, it would seem logical to say that an
attorney should be allowed to recover attorney's fees or costs
193 Stocking v. Moury, 128 Ga. 414, 57 S. E. 704 (1907).
194 Miller v. Mills, 32 Okla. 388, 122 P. 671 (1912); Jones v. McKinney, 224
S. W. 720 (Texas, 1920); Ring v. Merchants Broom Co., 68 Fla. 515, 67 So. 132
(1914); Contra: Exchange Bank v. Apalachain Land & Lumber Co., 128 N. C.
193, 38 S.E. 813 (1901).
195 Miller v. Mills, 320 Okla. 388, 122 P. 671 (1912); Jones v. McKinney, 224
S. W. 720 (Texas, 1920); Ring v. Merchants Broom Co., 68 Fla. 515, 67 So. 132
(1914); Contra: Exchange Bank v. Apalachain Land & Lumber Co., 128 N. C.
193, 38 S. E. 813 (1901).
196 McCoun v. Shipman, 75 Ind. App. 212, 128 N. E. 683 (1920).
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of collection where the note has been placed in his hands for
collection and he has attempted collection thereof, though
suit has not been brought. Certainly, though suit is not
brought, if the attorney does attempt collection his services
are worth something; and the creditor will be forced to pay
out of the principal sum unless the provision in the contract
is enforced.' 97 Though there are few cases on the point, the
courts that allow recovery at all seem to allow it whether or
not suit has been brought, provided effort has been ex-
pended. 9
In some jurisdictions if a note contains a clause for at-
torney's fees, "if suit is brought," or "if attorneys are em-
ployed to collect it," and the note is placed in the hands of
attorney to collect, the maker is liable for the fees whether
the note is paid in cash or a new note is executed in lieu of
the past due note. But this is not true in Indiana since un-
der a special statute the condition prevents recovery of any
attorney's fees.
Where the principal and interest of the note sued upon are
paid after commencement of suit and the pleadings are
amended stating such facts, the principal holder is still en-
titled to judgment for attorney's fees stipulated in the
note.' 99
The general rule, that a suit on a note is unwarranted until
maturity of such note,- also pertains to notes with provisions
for attorney's fees. Suits before a maturity bear no fruit. A
note, providing for attorney's fees, filed before maturity, as a
claim in an estate and properly allowed by the administrators
gives no right to attorney fees.2 °°
197 Williams v. Dockwiler, 19 N.M. 623, 145 P. 475 (1914).
198 Monroe v. Storer, 6 Ind. App. 364, 33 N. E. 665 (1893); Rouyer v. Mil-
ler, 16 Ind. App. 519 (1896); Indiana Bond Company v. Jameison, 24 Ind. App.
8, 56 N. E. 37 (1900); Morrison v. Ornbuum, 30 Mont. 111, 75 P. 953 (1904);
Maxey v. Somerton State Bank, 22 Ariz. 371,. 197 P. 894 (1921); Nett v. Stock-
growers Finance Corp., 84 Mont. 116, 274 P. 497 (193 ).
109 Nat. Park Bank of N. Y. v. Am. Brewing Co., 79 Mont. 542, 257 P. 436
(1927).
200 St. los. County Sav. Bank v. Randall, 37 Ind. App. 402, 76 N. E. 1012
(1906).
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Where plaintiff, after having agreed to make a settlement,
started suit on notes before the time fixed for such settle-
ment, she could not recover attorney's fees as called for in
the notes, since the contract to recover attorney's fees is one
of indemnity which is only effective in case of breach on the
part of the maker.2 '
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
The matter of conflict of laws deserves some attention in
a consideration of this subject. 2 ' Thus we find that nego-
tiable instruments are governed by the law relating to con-
tracts and the validity of a contract is to be determined by
the law of the place where it is made or is to be performed." 3
Place of performance of a promissory note is the place of
payment, and when a bill or note is executed in one sfate or
country and payable in another, the general rule is that it is
governed as to the nature, validity, interpretation, and ef-
fect by the laws of the state where made payable without re-
gard to the place where it is written, signed, or dated; it
being presumed that the parties contracted with reference to
the laws of that place especially where the note would be
void in the place where made and valid where payable.20 "
Thus in Virginia it has been held that a note containing a
provision for the payment of ten percent for attorney's fees
if valid in New York, which was the place of performance,
would be enforced in Virginia.20 '
In some states the provision for attorney's fees is held in-
valid; and in the jurisdiction so holding, no such fees can be
collected, though the stipulation was valid where made, since
the allowance is regarded as contrary to public policy.2"'
201 McConn v. Shipman, 75 Ind. App. 212, 128 N. E. 663 (1920).
202 Ogden's Negotiable Instruments, 4th ed., pp. 447-450.
203 Beadable v. Moore, 191 N. Y. S. 826, 199 App. Div. 531 (1922).
204 Beadable v. Moore, 191 N. Y. S. 826, 199 App. Div. 531 (1922).
205 R. S. Oglesby Co. v. N. Y. Bank, 114 Va. 663, 77 S. E. 468 (1913); Con-
tra: Exchange Bank v. Apalachain Land and Lumber Co., 128 N. C. 193, 38 S. E.
813 (1901); Campen Bros. v. Stewart, 106 W. Va., 247, 145 S. E. 381 (1929).
206 Sedgwick on Damages (9th ed.) Vol. 2, § 699c; Exchange Bank v. Apala-
chain Land and Lumber Co., 128 N. C. 193, 38 S. E. 813 (1901).
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West Virginia, Arkansas, Kansas, North Carolina and North
Dakota will not enforce a stipulation in a note for the pay-
ment of attorney's fees, the stipulation being contrary to the
policy of the law of these states.2 07 However, an Ohio court
will enforce, according to a federal decision, a judgment ren-
dered in Pennsylvania on a cognovit note made and pay-
able in Pennsylvania though the note contained a provision
for an attorney's fee, such a provision being valid in Penn-
sylvania, though against the public policy in Ohio. The the-
ory of this last case is that the Ohio courts must enforce
the Pennsylvania judgment under the full faith and credit
clause of the federal constitution."0
UNUSUAL PROVISION USED BY INDIANA BANKS.
The Indiana banks in order to avoid any semblance of a
condition as to attorney's fees in negotiable instruments are
unanimous in inserting in negotiable paper the following
only: "with .... per cent attorney's fees" or "with attorney's
fees." This is made necessary by the statute heretofore dis-
cussed, which makes void any provision to pay such fees on
any condition. It might be dangerous to attempt to add any
other words.
As this statute as to the payment of attorney's fees is
peculiar to Indiana it is unnecessary to take this precaution
in other jurisdictions, except where a matter might arise on
an instrument made in another jurisdiction which might be
governed by the law in Indiana.
In concluding this already too lengthy paper, may we be
privileged to ask a question asked us by a law student: "Was
the Kansas judge correct who made the following observa-
tion a score of years ago, in a certain decision?" 209
207 Campen Bros. v. Stewart, 106 W. Va. App. 247, 145 S. E. 381 (1928);
Arden Lumber Co. v. Henderson Iron Works & Supply Co., 83 Ark. 240, 103 S. W.
185 (1907); Young v. Nave, 135 Kan. 23, 10 P. 2d 23 (1932); Exchange Bank v.
Apalachain Land Co., 128 N. C. 193, 38 S. E. 813 (1901); Continental Supply
Co. v. Syndicate Trust Co., 92 N. D. 209, 212 N. W. 404 (1925).
208 Westwater v. Murray,,157 C. C. A. 589, 245 F. 427 (1917).
209 Holiday State Bank v. Hoffman, 85 Kan. 71, 116 P. 239, 35 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 390, Ann; Cas. 1912 D (1911).
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"The adoption in recent years of the negotiable instru-
ments law by so many of the states was in response to the
general desire for uniformity in respect to commercial paper.
The application, however, by the courts of legal principles
to particular facts has not reached scientific exactness and
never will. It is hardly to be expected, therefore, that the
courts of the different states which have adopted the act
will always agree in the construction and application of its
provisions. Actual uniformity in the law of negotiable instru-
ments will remain a dream more or less iridescent; substan-
tial uniformity is all that can be hoped for."
James M. Ogden.
President of Indiana Law School, Indianapolis, Indiana.
